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ABSTRACT
This thesis is to generally review the practices and cases in the global capital market
places in regard to the divestitures as one of the corporate restructuring instruments and
to confirm the generally acceptable hypothesis that the most of breakup cases driven by
the strategic purpose of "focus and concentration" would be justified by the enhancement
of shareholders value. And the discussion expands to the divestitures in Korea introduced
in late 1990s, which prevailed and practiced widely in the market ever since, but in some
cases, it was combined with formation of the holding company structure in accordance to
the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act making the issue complicated one in regard
to the reform and restructuring of major conglomerates, the "Chaebol" in Korea. The LG
demerger cases were right in the center of the discussions, and this thesis is to address
four hypotheses in regard to the background, key components, aftermaths, and the
implication of the LG's transaction through which it would be assessed in terms of
shareholders value and corporate governance in the context of Korean practice.
Thesis Supervisor: Arnoldo C. Hax
Title: Professor of Management
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1. Introduction
1.1 Current Global Divestiture Events
The financial news on the "mega-breakup" is quite popular these days, almost as
many as the "mega mergers", and the events seems to become a fashion in modem
corporate practices. The announcement, on October 25, 2000, that AT&T would break
itself into 4 different entities - Wireless, Broadband, Consumer, and Business - wasn't an
astonishing news at all because the market players already experienced the precedent
breakups of AT&T twice in 1984 and 1995.
It seems many of merged companies of which deals were executed by the inflated
market valuation in late 1990's and early 2000's are suffering from the wrong direction
of diversification as well as the economic downturn and depreciation of share prices.
AOL Time Warner, the world largest media monster created by the record breaking
mega-merger, is not an exception now, and the management has floated the idea of
breakup as a solution of troubled AOL division, prompting speculation that the company
could demerge in 2003. 
Divestiture cases have been noticed as an instrument of corporate restructuring,
such as for focus and concentration, enhancement of shareholders value, privatization of
public sectors, and acquisition fallouts. The thing is that divestitures have been usually
welcome by capital market and its investors in the US and Europe altogether. Therefore,
we would generally uphold the hypothesis in the textbook, "Investors in U.S companies
seem to reward focus, penalize diversification." 2
'October 29, 2002, Owen Gibson, Media Guardian
2 Richard A. Brealey / Stewart C. Myers: "Principles of Corporate Finance", Page 971, 7 th Edition,
McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
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1.2 Current Korean Practice
Before the foreign currency crisis, Korean business conglomerates, "Chaebol", had
just one-way direction of corporate strategy towards diversification. In Chaebol's practice,
unlike the Anglo-Saxon corporate culture, it was quite unusual to scrap even money
losing business out of the "family", meaning that there was virtually no exit strategy once
the Conglomerate got involved in certain business.
However, things changed remarkably in the midst of IMF bailout when they were
asked to restructure themselves in ways to achieve their financial soundness and
management efficiencies. Since it was a semi-revolutionary situation, the government
strongly pushed private sectors to that direction through reform and deregulation of
relevant laws and regulations while the foreign investors brought up with out quite
demanding agendas to their investee companies.
As the divestiture was formally allowed in 1998 by the revision of Commercial
Code together with the regarding tax relief, the breakups became a trend epidemic,
starting as a measure to scrap the minor fallouts in the earlier stage, and spreading out to
the public companies in pursuing various financial goals later on. In 2002, the breakups
of publicly trading companies became a sort of fashion in capital market of Korea.
Among the breakup cases, the LG case was the largest, most complicated, and
symbolic one which had comprehensive implication in regard to the Korean corporate
finance practices. LG, the 2 nd largest conglomerate in Korea, really made serious decision
to break up its main business entities to cope with the business, market, and regulatory
demands as well as the internal demands regarding the corporate control structure.
Unique feature of the transaction was the formation of a holding company as a
-5-
controlling legal entity of post breakup, which was allowed by the controversial revision
of the Fair Trade Act in 1999.
1.3 Key Issues on Discussion
Consequently, the basic direction of this thesis is to address the following themes,
which would be properly explained, referred, and proved.
- Obtaining the updated insights of divestiture as global common practice
: its theoretical backgrounds and empirical aftermaths in modem corporate finance
- Identifying Korean divestiture practice in the context of IMF bailout and global trends
- Assessment of LG Divestiture Model: Shareholders Value, Corporate Control and
Governance Aspects, and its implications in the long run
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2. General Review on Divestitures
2.1 Structures of Divestiture and its Terminologies
"Divestiture" or "Breakup" has been used as general term referring any kind of
corporate fissions, and often, it is mixed up with "spin-off', and "split" in practice which
is also called "demerger" in the British. However, the followings are generally defined as
one of the sub-categories of "Divestiture" or "Breakup".3
Most Common Form of Divestiture: Spin-offs ("Demerger" in the British term)
Spin-off is one of the divesting schemes to form a new company by splitting
certain portion of assets or operations of existing company, and eventually the shares of
new company will be distributed as dividend proportionally to the shareholders of
divesting company.
Pre Spin-off Post Spin-off
Consequently, the shareholders will own the shares of new company - divested company
- as well as the divesting company, which is the most common form of divestiture. In the
3 Countries adopting the Civil Law System, most continental European such as France and Germany define
the specific schemes of divestiture in their Corporate Law, while United States doesn't have any specific
regulation in regard to the divestitures other than the Internal Revenue Codes stating the boundaries of tax
free breakup transactions. Jin Su Kim: "Taxation Policies in regard to the Corporate Divestitures", KIPF
(Korea Institute of Public Finance), December 1998
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1
same process of breakup, the divested new shares can be unequally distributed reflecting
the specific intention or preferences of shareholders, which they call "Split-off'. 4
Regardless of the scheme of breakup - Spin-off or Split-off, the mother company,
the divesting entity, will not have any shareholdings in its affiliate, the divested entity, so
that both will be separated completely as a result of the breakup and managed
autonomously.
Incomplete Form of Divestiture : Equity Carve-Out
It's exactly same as Spin-off in a sense that the divesting entity sets up the new
company as affiliate and transfer specific assets and operations. However, the difference
is that the shares of new company will belong to the divesting company itself, not its
shareholders. Also it is followed by the IPO(Initial Public Offering) of the affiliate so that
the mother company cash out some or most of the portion of its investment in affiliate.
Carving-out company is to reduce risks of particular business in its portfolio by
partial disposition of its carved-out shares, consequently monetizing some of its assets in
operation. But, usually, the mother company remains as majority controlling party even
after carve-out except the case that the mother company entirely sell off the carved-out
shares to 3 rd party. s In that sense, carve-out is one of the incomplete schemes of
divestiture. 6
4 In case of the publicly listed company, mostly it is executed through the redemption of "class stock" in
exchange of the new shares of divested company. Case: General Motors' redemption of the class stock of
EDS by issuing the new shares. Sang Su Park: "Win-Win Strategy of Business Restructuring I", Economy
Weekly 459, LG Research Institute, March 18, 1998
5 So-called "trade sale"
6 The parent company must retain an 80 percent interest to consolidate the subsidiary with the parent's tax
account. Richard A. Brealey / Stewart C. Myers : "Principles of Corporate Finance", 7 th Edition, Page 971,
McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
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Internal Split without New Company: Tracking Stocks
Tracking stock is a class of parent company stock that tracks and claims the
earnings or assets of certain business division within the company. Usually the newly
issued shares are granted to the current shareholders as dividend, and accompanied with
Initial Public Offering. It is most incomplete form of divestiture in a sense that it is not
separated from the parent body, also remaining under the control of parent's board. So
tracking stock is very unusual form of divestiture even in US, and is not allowed in most
of the countries adopting the civil law system.7
Another Simple Form of Divestiture: Asset Sale
From the divesting company's point of view, the simplest form of divestiture is the
"Asset Sale", which includes not only the sale of particular asset of certain business
operation but the sale of affiliate shares, through so-called M&A.
Asset Sale is also the very direct and quick method of corporate restructuring and
result in the most complete separation, however, unlike the spin-offs and carve-out, it's
not usually tax free transaction, which can be critical issue in preservation of the
fundamental value of the post divestiture.
7 Since the General Motors issued the first of them with its acquisition of EDS in 1984, a total of 23 have
been listed in the US, Patricia Anslinger, Steven Klepper and Somu Subramanian: "Breaking up is good to
do?", Mckinsey Quarterly, 1999, Number 1
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2.2 General Background of Divestiture: Shift of Managerial Trends, "Economy of Scale
-* Focus & Concentration"
It has been believed that there are substantial advantages in diversification of such
as mergers, acquisitions, and new entries, achieving synergies, cost efficiencies, financial
accountability, and risk-mitigating portfolio effect mostly from the so-called "Economy
of Scale".
Many businesses of the United States pursued the growth through diversification in
1960's, forming the "conglomerate" of which businesses consisted of various unrelated
industries. Also the "conglomerate" has been the majority model of forming industrial
capital in most Asian countries, especially in Korea by the name of "Chaebol".
However, in the United States, it didn't take so long time that the diversification of
unrelated industries turned out to be inefficient, out of fashion, eventually most of the
conglomerates divested themselves through spin-offs.8
Theoretically when the costs of being a well-diversified company such as
conglomerate surpass the benefits from the economy of scale, the issues of divestiture
emerge. In case of conglomerates, the key management members have to manage the
variety of business divisions and also function as decision maker of internal capital
market. So if they are to be justified, it must be assumed that the key management
members are supposed to be equally efficient in managing all of divisions as they are
managed independently, and their financial decisions on the allocation of financial assets
must be as efficient as those of the market, all of which are hardly true historically.
8 Even though there were some exceptions such as GE, most of the conglomerates created in the 1960s
were broken up in 1980s and early 1990s, including the symbolic case of ITT, which ranked 8th largest
corporation as of 1979 with the operation in 38 different industries, sold and spun-off many different lines
of business until 1995. Richard A. Brealey / Stewart C. Myers: "Principles of Corporate Finance", 7 th
Edition, Page 974, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
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Therefore, reflecting those underlying costs as conglomerates causing the distrust and
undervaluation of the company in the market, the demands towards divestiture increase
over time. Moreover, it is also true, in some cases, there are pressures even to breakup the
homogenous core business into the smaller ones to achieve "Focus and Concentration"
rather than "Economy of Scale".
The textbook of Brealey and Myers estimates the average conglomerate discount at
12 to 15 percent, considering the potential overinvestment and misallocation of
resources.9 Some author argues that the overall performance of a Multi-Business
Company ("MBC" hereafter) is often less than the performance would be if the business
units were independent, of which difference is not small. He estimates about 10-50
percent of value is destroyed, if all other things are equal, by the formation of a multi-
business organization.' 0
In addition, the Mckinsey research on the Fortune 1000 companies illustrates that
the business performances of smaller corporations in terms of shareholders value are
much better than those of the bigger ones. It can be interpreted that the smaller companies
are quite in good position to be swift in innovation to cope with the shortened cycle of the
product life in the modem market together with, needless to say, the efficiencies in
communication within the organization.
9 Generally, we can't believe that the key management members of conglomerates will make fair decisions
about all the investments, often destroying the shareholders value by investing the negative NPV projects,
even worse, transferring the resources between business divisions without considering the principle of
arms-length transaction. Richard A. Brealey / Stewart C. Myers : "Principles of Corporate Finance", 7th
Edition, Page 975, McGraw-Hill Companies, 2003
10 David Sadtler / Andrew Campbell / Richard Koch : Executive Summary, "Breakup! - How Companies
Use Spin-offs to Gain Focus and Growing Strong", The Free Press of Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997
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Table 1 : Business Size and Creation of Shareholders Value l
Period
Companies
January 30, 1995 through September 30, 2000
American companies among Global Fortune 1000
Amount
(% shares)
Fortune 100
Fortune 101-500
Fortune 500-1000
Sales
$6.0 trillion
57%
33%
10%
Shareholders Value
$1.5 trillion
16%
25%
69%
In that context, many companies may suffer from the disease of value destruction,
and spin-off has been the prevailing solution these days of which annual transaction value
mounted to the level of $100 billion, became an irreversible tide. 12
2.3 Immediate Causes of Divestitures : "Focus and Shareholders Value"
Table 2.Relative Importance of Immediate Causes of Breakup in the Landmark Cases ('82-'96) 13
Reason Number of Occurences Comment
US UK Total
Focus
Fair Value
Reduce Debt
Poor Performer
Fear of Takeover
Competitive Conflict
Enhance Capital Raising
Quarantine Problem
Regulatory
Tax Efficiency
12
7
7
5
0
4
2
2
2
I
10
3
1
0
4
0
1
1
0
0
22
10
8
5
4
4
3
3
2
1
The Standard Answer
Everything to do with Stock Price
Little noted by commentator
Mainly UK
Unwindling vertical integration
Telecoms
" David Campbell, Ron Hulme : "The Winner-takes-all Economy", Mckinsey Quarterly, 2001, Number I
12 Some analysis of the Fortune 100 and the FTSE 100 suggested that a large percentage of MBCs were
over-diversified, more than half of the large companies in US and the UK. MBO, LBO and hostile
takeovers were the traditional solutions to mitigate that kind of value destructions, however, the Breakup
proved to be the fastest, easiest, most tax efficient, and least revolutionary method. David Sadtler / Andrew
Campbell / Richard Koch: "Breakup! - How Companies Use Spin-offs to Gain Focus and Growing
Strong", The Free Press of Simon & Schuster Inc., Page 14, 1997
13 David Sadtler / Andrew Campbell / Richard Koch: "Breakup! - How Companies Use Spin-offs to Gain
Focus and Growing Strong", The Free Press of Simon & Schuster Inc., Page 42, 1997
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As the repercussion of drawbacks from over-diversification, the divestitures were
mainly driven by the momentum of pursuing "Focus and Concentration on the core
business", each of which cases were clearly the responses to the market pressure, so
called "under-valuation" basically caused by two components,
Managerial Context. As discussed previously, the over-diversification of business implies
various managerial issues such as subsidization to money losing operations as well as the
cost of communication and misallocation of resources.
Investors' Context. Most of cases, investors prefer simple business, easy to understand
and analyze because they want to set the portfolio for their own purely based on the
investors point of view. So it's very natural they avoid the investments in the diversified
companies which are hardly fit into their scopes of portfolio and also expensive due to
the over-paid premiums for the acquisitions.
Market concerns those and reacts with the discount in share prices, and this strong
signal of the market pushes management to initiate the divestitures. In that sense, the two
main reasons of divestitures illustrated above are virtually identical; Market demands
"focus" of the business, management responses it with divestitures to get the fair
valuation of the market.
Other immediate causes of divestitures are mostly related with financial
restructuring measures or regulatory compliance issues, however, regardless of the
apparent reasons, most of them are closely related with the management efficiencies so
that they are to achieve the fair market valuation as aftermaths. The details are as follows,
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Table 3. Twenty Landmark US Breakups / Ten Landmark UK Breakups ('82-'96)14
Year Company
(USA)
1982 AT&T
1995 AT&T
1992 Baxter Int'l
1995 Baxter Int'l
1994
1996
1995
1995
General Mills
GM
Grace
ITT Corp.
1994 Lilly
1992 Marriott
1995 Marriott
1995
1992
1994
1996
3M
Pacific Telesis
Sears
Tenneco
1996 PepsiCo
1996 American
Brands
1996 Monsanto
1996 Rockwell
(UK)
1990 BAT
1996 British Ga
1990 Courtauld,
1994 ECC
1995 Hanson
1996 Hanson
1993 ICI
1996 Lonrho
1990 Racal
1995 Thorn EM
New Entities
Baby Bells
NCR / Lucent
Caremark
(Home Health Care)
Allegiance
(Hospital Distribution)
Darden Restaurants
EDS
National Medical Care
ITT Hartford
ITT Industries
ITT Corp.(Hotels)
Guidant (Medical Dev)
Hotel Real Estate
Concession Business
Imation
Cellular
Allstate Insurance
Newport News
(Shipbuilder)
Restaurant Business
Gallaher Tabacco
Chemicals
Int'l Automotive Comp.
I
I
Argus (Catalog Retail)
Arjo Wiggins (Paper)
British Gas Centrica
Chemicals, Coatings
Aggregates
US Industries
Breakup
Zeneca
Hotel Business
Vodaphone
EMI Music
Thorn Retails
Reasons Stated
Regulatory(Anti-Trust)
Focus
Competitive Conflict
Competitive Conflict
Focus / Fair Value
Focus
Focus
Focus / Fair Value
Focus
Enhance Capital Raisin,
Focus / Fair Value
Focus
Focus
Enhance Capital Raisinl
Poor Performer
Regulatory / Fair Value
Focus
Focus
Focus
Poor Performer
Fair Value
Poor Performner
Fair Value
Poor Performer
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus
Focus / Fair Value
Enhance Capital Raisinl
Focus / Fair Value
Focus
Focus / Fair Value
Additional Reasons
Reduce Debts
Reduce Debts
Poor Performer
Competitive Conflict
Competitive Conflict
Reduce Debts
Fair Value
Reduce Debts
Quarantine Problem
Reduce Debts
Reduce Debts
Reduce Debts
Reduce Debts
Quarantine Problems
Fair Value
Takeover Fear
Quarantine Problems
Takeover Fear
Reduce Debts
Takeover Fear
g
Takeover Fear
14 David Sadtler / Andrew Campbell / Richard Koch: "Breakup! - How Companies Use Spin-offs to Gain
Focus and Growing Strong", The Free Press of Simon & Schuster Inc., Page 41-42, 1997
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2.4 Cost Aspects of Divestitures
The cost aspects of divestiture are often discussed, even though those were not so
significant in the full context, to formulate the consequences and characteristics of
divestitures. Those are the tax and cost of capital issues.
Cost 1: Transaction Tax
In most cases, the divesting transactions are tax-free under certain conditions and
circumstance. In the US, the Internal Revenue Code 355 grants the tax relief on the stock
dividend and capital gain in transaction of spin-offs, implying that the government
encourages the spin-offs as a corporate restructuring measure. The trend to support and
protect the divestitures both by the Corporate Law and Tax Codes is very common
practice in developed countries, so usually the divestiture doesn't incur any additional
cost in terms of tax.
Cost 2: Cost of Capital
Also, there can be a concern regarding post-divestiture cost structure of capital,
which is very legitimate reasoning since the divestiture is usually accompanied with
significant changes especially in the capital structure of the related entities. Many
imagine that the cost of capital must be higher than that of before divestitures due to the
reduced financial accountabilities of both the divesting and divested firms. However,
many argues that the over-diversified business demands higher risk premium for its
equity investors due to the uncertainty, so the divestiture will release the tension from the
- 15-
investor, resulting in the stabilization of cost of capital.'5 Generally it can be inferred that
the overall average cost of capital of divesting and divested entities after divestiture will
remain unchanged or at least won't change significantly upwards.
In general, it can be said that the divestitures are free from the additional cost, or at
least, it won't be significant, if any.
2.5 Aftermath of Divestitures as Solution
While some studies stipulated that many mergers eventually destroyed the
shareholders value, most of the divestitures were positively assessed in capital market in
line with the discussions 2.2 -2.4.
Short Term View upon Disclosure
Unsurprisingly, many researches concluded that the market disclosures of
divestitures were accompanied by the 'leaping' of share prices in very short term, which
meant the divestitures were directly welcome by the market sentiment - perceived as
friendly transactions to the market. The studies on reaction to the disclosure of
divestitures are as follows,
* Schipper & Smith (1983) analyzed 93 spin-off cases in New York Stock Exchange
between 1963 through 1981, and concluded the share prices of divesting companies
gained 2.84% excessive returns
15 Richard J. Schmidt: "The divestiture Option - A guide for Financial and Corporate Planning
Executives", Quorum Books, Page 102, 1990. / Also there was a study about the cost of capital of AT&T
upon the divestiture in 1982, arguing that the divestiture wouldn't change the cost of capital to the Bell
system, David S. Evans: "Breaking Up Bell - Essays on Industrial Organization and Regulation", A CERA
research study, Elsevier Science Publishing Co, October 1, 1982
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* Slovin, Sushka & Ferraro (1995) analyzed 37 spin-off cases in New York Stock
Exchange between 1980 through 1991, and concluded the share prices of divesting
companies gained average 1.32% excessive returns 16
Longer Term View
In the longer term, the share prices of divesting entities generally tended to
outperform the market in spite of some deviations, meaning that the overall divestitures
created the shareholders value at least in terms of market valuation.
* JP Morgan (1999) analyzed 231 spin-off and carve-out cases between 1985 and 1998,
extracted the data that the spin-offs exceeded S&P Index by 11.3% while the carve-outs
exceeded S&P Index by 10.1% during the 18 months periods after divestitures. 17
* Mckinsey Quarterly (2000) analyzed various cases of spin-offs and carve-outs between
1988 through 1996, and the data regarding stock returns during the two year periods after
the divestitures were, 18
Form of Div. Stock Return S&P 500 No. of Sample
Divesting Entities Spin-offs 18.2 17.5 79
(Parent Co) Carve-outs 22.1 16.5 46
Tracking Stocks 21.4 21.5 16
Divested Entities Spin-offs 27.1 16.3 78
(Subsidiary) Carve-outs 23.8 11.0 67
Tracking Stocks 19.2 21.0 23
16 Two cases from Jin Su Kim: "Taxation Policies in regard to the Holding Company System", KIPF
(Korea Institute of Public Finance), Page 1 1, December 1999
17 Donald Depamphilis: "Mergers, Acquisitions, and other Restructuring Activities: An Integral Approach
to Process, Tools, Cases, and Solutions", Academic Press, February 2001
18 Patricia Anslinger, Sheila Bonini and Michael Patsalos-Fox: "Doing the Spin-out", Mckinsey Quarterly,
2000, Number I
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According to Mckinsey research, it was clear that stock returns of the spin-offs and
carve-outs cases outperformed the market during the two years of post transaction, which
were more obvious for the divested entities than those of the parents, implying that the
independence from the parents enahnced the values of subsidiaries. 19
2.6 Generally Acceptable Hypothesis and its Conditions
With all the discussions and argument of 2.2 through 2.5, we are possibly able to
support the hypothesis suggested in 1.1 that "Most of divestiture cases driven by the
momentum of 'focus' and 'concentration' tended to be justified by the positive market
valuations in relatively short term period."
However, the possible argument is that the benefits of divestitures must prove
themselves through the enhancement of intrinsic value of the business in the long run,
otherwise the possibly inflated market values have to be retrieved after all. This generic
but purely theoretical assumption must be carefully tested in general. But, unfortunately,
there are not many reliable research results on the correlation and relevance between
divestitures cases and its long term financial performances, so the above hypothesis of
relatively short term period would be paralleled with the reviews of long run financial
results in the interpretation of individual cases.
19 In the same article are mentioned the aspects of improving operating performance; if we examine the
operating performance of newly traded subsidiaries during the two years from the time of issue, we see, on
average, substantial increases in the return on invested capital (ROIC) both in the tracking stocks and the
spin-offs, while the ROIC of carve-outs dips slightly. Carve-outs instead enjoy high revenue growth after
they begin trading, with an average annual gain of 32 percent
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3. Global Trend, Practice of Divestitures / Case Review, ITT and AT&T
3.1 Trend Epidemic
The demands of divestitures emerge over time as one of the corporate restructuring
tools and solutions in the United States and European countries, the government bodies
have polished and updated the relevant laws and regulations to support and even boost
the transactions, including tax relieves and revision of anti-trust provisions as well as the
basic corporate law.
As a result, the total value of transactions divestitures mounted almost to the level
of $100 billion annually. It was merely annual average of $1.1 billion in the early 1980s
excluding the AT&T case, and this average jumped to $6.1 billion for 1985-90, leaped
further to $14.8 for 1990-94, and it was phenomenal afterwards and now it seems like an
irreversible tide as featured below. 20
Exhibit 1. Value of Breakups in the US, 1985-96 (In USD bn)
20 David Sadtler / Andrew Campbell / Richard Koch : "Breakup! - How Companies Use Spin-offs to Gain
Focus and Growing Strong", The Free Press of Simon & Schuster Inc., 1997
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Dollar Value of Breakups in the US, 1985-96 (In USD billion)
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As illustrated in table 3, most of the landmark breakups were to aim the 'focus' of
the main business usually triggered by the pressure from market, and started to rush in
1995 when the ITT and AT&T declared the symbolic mega breakups which were
followed by the other renown breakups in 1996 - General Motors and EDS, PepsiCo and
its Restaurant Business. Among the landmark divestitures, the ITT and AT&T cases
bring the key relevant issues for the main topics in regard to the Chapter 5.
3.2 ITT - Breakup of Conglomerate
ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph) formed the very unique conglomerate
in the United States throughout the 1960s and 70s, and became the largest one as of 1979.
Table 4. The largest conglomerates in 1979, ranked by sales compared to all US
industrial corporations. 21
Sales Rank Company Number of Industries
8 International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT) 38
15 Tenneco 28
42 Gulf & Western Industries 41
51 Litton Industries 19
66 LTV 18
73 Illinois Central Industries 26
103 Textron 16
104 Greyhound 19
128 Martin Marietta 14
ITT's unrelated diversification was phenomenal, pursuing the safety of business
portfolio and the higher margins within the territory, so the acquisitions were made in any
industry under the tenure of Chairman Harold Green until 1977, and the financial results
were, surprisingly, very successful so far.
21 Richard A. Brealey / Stewart C. Myers: "Principles of Corporate Finance", 7th Edition, McGraw-Hill
Companies, Page 974, 2003
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However, expectedly, as the profitability of the entire business slowed in 1980s so
that the market were getting skeptical about their legitimacy of that corporate model, it
started to send strong signal of distrust - undervaluation, stipulating conglomerate
discount. As time went on, it was getting clear that the unrelated diversification was
quickly losing the competitiveness as a corporate organization model, the conglomerate
went out of fashion rapidly.
The next Chairman Rand Araskog recognized the realities and sold some 200
companies, nonetheless, ITT remained a conglomerate of enormous range and it
continued to grow, so they reached $24 billion of sales in 1995 22 when ITT announced
the symbolic breakups into three bodies - Manufacturing (ITT Industries), Insurance
(ITT Hartford), Leisure and Hotel (ITT Corporation).
It was obviously driven by the severe pressure of the market valuation and
managerial issues together and was welcome by the market with 30% price jump,
formulating the virtual end of conglomerate period in the US, triggering the follow-up
divestitures in late 1990s. Also, needless to say, the most of the conglomerate in table 4
were broken up in 1980s-90s.
3.3 AT&T - Breakups of Horizontal and Vertical Integration
AT&T had been the ubiquitous monster as legally sanctioned, regulated monopoly
until 1984 when it broke up into 7 Baby Bells. Even though it started practice the
divestitures by the regulatory causes, it formed a model of swift corporate reorganization
through divesting as well as the massive acquisitions to cope with the rapidly changing
22 David Sadtler / Andrew Campbell / Richard Koch: "Breakup! - How Companies Use Spin-offs to Gain
Focus and Growing Strong", The Free Press of Simon & Schuster Inc., Page 6, 1997
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business and technological environment. The cases illustrate the comprehensive
dimensions of divestitures in breaking up the horizontal and vertical integration of
business over time.
3.3.1 1st Divestiture in 1984: Regulation Driven
Background and Transaction
Up until early 1980s, AT&T, as the universal telephone service provider, formed
the largest company in the world with assets of $155 billion and one million employees,
of which business operations included (1) the 22 BOCs(Bell Operating Companies)
providing the local telephone service, installation and repairs (2) AT&T Long Lines, the
interstate long-distance division, carrying all Bell System calls made between states. (3)
Western Electrics, the AT&T's manufacturer of telephone equipment (4) Bell Labs, the
AT&T's famous research and development arm.
Horizontal Integration: Even though there were other 1,450 Independent
Telephone Companies competing BOCs, their share was only around 10% of US retail
market. In case of Long Distance Competitors, the OCCs(*Other Common Carriers, MCI,
GTE-Sprint, ITT and so on) occupied just about 20% of the market. So it was obvious
that the level of concentration and horizontal integration of market by AT&T could be a
concern for fair competition of the market.
Vertical Integration: The Bell System (*The BOCs and Long Lines) bought 80%
of its equipments from Western Electric, its manufacturing arm, and this transaction
accounted for 90% of Western's revenues. The level of vertical integration of
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manufacturing and captive purchasing practices had been a long-run concern for the
obstacle of technologic development.23
So, as AT&T set up itself horizontal and vertical integration nationwide, there had
been many speculations about Bell System's benefit and setbacks. Also technological
innovation and the strong American tradition of competition had raised issues about the
legitimacy of AT&T's monopoly rights.24 The pressure toward reform persistently came
to the attention of Antitrust Division, Justice Department who brought an antitrust suit
against AT&T in 1974. Finally, after long litigation, the Justice Department and AT&T
reached to the Modified Final Judgement (MFJ), dismantling AT&T to breakup into
AT&T main body itself and 7 regional players, the Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs), so called Baby Bells - NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, Southwestern Bell,
Ameritech, US West and Pacific Telesis.
Consequences
It was said that most aftermaths of AT&T's breakup were positive from the
customers point of view. The long distance telephone rates dropped approximately 40%
in five years, and there was "rash" of new innovative services introduced together with
the explosion of new telecommunication equipment driven by the increased R&D
investments. Also the main concerns on the breakup were addressed as follows,
23 Samuel A. Simon: "After Divestiture: What the AT&T Settlement Means for Business and Residential
Telephone Service", Knowledge Industry Publications, Chapter 1-2, 1985
24 Mr. Michael Baudhuin described in the Communication Forum as: During the 1970s, AT&T "went
through turmoil" regarding regulation at the Federal State levels. AT&T argued for "Integrated Network of
Service from end to end". In contrast, regulators were "crying for competition in hopes of bringing down
prices and increasing the pace of technological innovation. Gail Kosloff: "Divestiture: Five Years and
Counting", Seminar Notes of Massachusetts Institute of Technology Communications Forum, May 4, 1989
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(1) Divestiture may impact negatively on the Universal Service in the US. However,
telephone penetration increased from 91.5% to 92.8% in five years of post-divestiture.
(2) Divestiture may cause the double or triple the cost of telephone service instantly.
However, it didn't happen. The absolute average billing amount per customer barely
increased for the following a few years.
(3) Divestiture may decline the quality of service. There was an initial decline, but was
back at pre-divestiture levels quickly.
(4) Also many feared that AT&T might go back to monopoly dominating the other
players even after divestitures, but it never happen, and the competition became
increasingly vigorous and the market share of AT&T decreased at approximately 2% per
year after divestiture.
As a whole, by removing the cross-subsidy granted within the integration and
stimulating the competition, the significant productivity gains were materialized in the
relatively short time period, which were attributable to improvement in technology and
more well-managed companies. The first divestiture was an undoubted success even
though it was involuntary one.25
3.3.2 2nd Divestiture in 1995: Business Restructuring towards Focusing
On September 20, 1995, AT&T announced another surprising mega-divestiture in
history, the separation of its manufacturing arm and computer company, each of which
became Lucent Technologies and NCR respectively afterwards. Those transactions were
25 From 1-4, refer to, Gail Kosloff: "Divestiture: Five Years and Counting", Seminar Notes of
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Communications Forum, May 4, 1989
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based on the voluntary strategic decision of AT&T for the sake of business restructuring
towards "Focus".
Lucent Technology
Upon the 1st divestitures, the manufacturing operation recast as AT&T Network
System had to experience the transition from monopoly to competition. Moreover, the
predicament was the conflict of interests between its customers, the RBOCs and the
AT&T's main body itself. As the regulatory environments advanced over time, the
drawbacks were getting more significant than the synergies, meaning that the two
businesses became obstacles for each others growth.
Therefore, AT&T decided mainly to break it up in the "Trivestiture", renamed it
Lucent and legally spun-out through IPO and distribution of remaining shares to its
shareholders, so it became independent on September 30, 1996. The table below shows
clearly that the divestiture removed the bottleneck of business, achieving breakthrough in
financial performance afterwards.
Table 5. Key figures of Income Statement Pre and Post Divestiture, Lucent
Technologies 26
(Unit: USD million)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Revenues 17,312 17,734 19,76 21,413 24,215 27,611 31,806 38,303
Operating Expenses 16,908 17,065 18,79 22,413 24,871 26,012 29,168 32,897
Operation Income 404 669 97 (1,000) (656) 1,599 2,638 5,406
NCR
In1991, AT&T acquired computer maker NCR, renamed it AT&T Global
Information Solution("GIS"), in a $7.3 billion deal to pursue the combined service in the
26 Hae Jin Je, FKI-International Management Institute :"Seminar: Strategy of Divestitures", FKI (The
Federation of Korean Industries), Page 125, November 27, 2002
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convergence of communication and computing. However, it was an obvious failure in
post acquisition management so that GIS suffered from the reversed-synergy resulting in
the operating deficits three years in a row. So AT&T couldn't avoid the "acquisition fall-
out", deciding to include it in the "Trivestiture".
The distribution of share dividend for spin-off was completed as of December 31,
1996, and NCR became independent. After divestiture, NCR came out of the big deficit
by massive cutting of expenses.
Table 6. Key figures of Income Statement Pre and Post Divestiture, NCR 27
Revenues
Operating Expenses
Operation Income
1991 1992
7,246 7,139
7,144 6,884
102 255
1993
7,265
7,546
(281)
1994
8,461
8,563
(102)
(Unit: USD million)
1997 1998 1999
6,589 6,505 6,196
6,608 6,403 6,118
(19) 102 78
The 2nd divestiture of AT&T could be said to be another great success after all,
because it created substantial shareholders value in terms of market valuation in post-
divestiture periods as well as it turned around the financial performances of the divested
entities in aftermath.28
27 Hae Jin Je, FKI-International Management Institute :"Seminar: Strategy of Divestitures", FKI (The
Federation of Korean Industries), Page 127, November 27, 2002
28 The pre-divestiture valuation of AT&T was $75 billion, however, little more than a year later, in January
1998, the separately trading AT&T, Lucent, and NCR had a combined market capitalization of $159 billion.
They explained it attributable not only to the improvements of financial performances but to some technical
aspects; the divestitures increased the coverage of analysts. In fact, Lucent picked up coverage from 24
telecom equipment analysts, previously, only two of them had covered AT&T. The parents, whose
remaining analysts could focus on it more closely, benefited as well. Also additionally they explained it
attributable to the attraction of new investors who was little overlap between people who invested in a
parent company and the improved management incentives and corporate governance as results of
restructuring. Patricia Anslinger, Steven Klepper and Somu Subramanian : "Breaking up is good to do",
Mckinsey Quarterly, 1999, Number 1
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1995 1996
8,162 6,963
10,533 6,833
(2,371) 130
3.3.3 3rd Divestiture: Pressure from Market and Shareholders
As Michael Armstrong joined as Chairman and CEO of AT&T in November 1997,
AT&T went on to another journey to be an "any-distance" company from long distance
company. Since they think the long distance voice alone was likely to decline, he
determined to transform the company focus from a voice call to any form which delivers
the information comprehensively - voice, data, and video.
So over the next a few years, AT&T aggressively acquired businesses in the areas
of the local telephone service (TCG), global data networking service (IBM Global
Network), and many others (Teleport, MetroNet and so on), and also merged with large
cable companies (TCI and MediaOne) by which AT&T broadband became the largest
cable company in the US. Consequently, by mid-2000, AT&T had three rapidly evolving
networks - data, broadband, and wireless which enabled the bundled package service of
local, long distance, wireless telephone and internet access service. The strategy proved
to be on the right track by the fact that the volume of data traffic exceeded that of voice
traffic on AT&T network in year 2000.
However, due to the over-spent budget for mergers and acquisition 29 and
slowdown of economy and IT industries, AT&T suffered from the massive losses in 2000,
resulting in the strong pressure from market and shareholders to cope with the crisis.
In response to that demands, in October 2000, AT&T announced to go to the
reversing direction of its strategy - horizontal integration of business line-up, breaking
itself up into 4 independent entities over next two years - AT&T Wireless, AT&T
Broadband, AT&T Business, and AT&T Consumer. Under the restructuring plan, the
AT&T Wireless became an independent company on July 9, 2001, and the AT&T
29 It was estimated that Michael Armstrong spent $140 billion for M&A in the early stage of his tenure
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Broadband was merged with Comcast upon spin-off on November 18, 2002. Also AT&T
Consumer, the premiere consumer communications and marketing company, was
separated through tracking stock from the main body of AT&T Business.
Upon divestiture, AT&T Chairman Michael Armstrong stipulated that the breakups
were pivotal events in the transformation, so the separating entities would continue to
collaborate under competitive, long-term commercial contracts and coverage of strong
brand of AT&T. So he insisted that it was an event combining the power of common
vision - comprehensive service with horizontal integration of business - together with
meeting the demands of the focus and flexibility of separate companies.
It is too early to assess the benefit of transaction, but Michael Armstrong didn't
really conceal the facts that the divestitures were basically triggered by the pressure of
shareholders asking the enhancement in market value. It seemed he reached a
compromise with market by breakup of AT&T while preserving the collaboration
structure among the business families, which we have to watch and see what's the
consequences of the transaction in the long run.
3.4 Implications from ITT / AT&T Cases
Most of breakup cases in the US suggested that the divestitures were driven by the
ultimate goal of shareholders value, in other words, by the pure economic sense and
criteria. So it was taken for granted that divestitures were generally practiced upon the
demanding signals from the market, and the shareholders values in terms of market
valuation were usually enhanced just by the implementation of divestitures.
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Both ITT and AT&T divestiture cases illustrated that the largest companies - world
largest or multi-diversified - were to practice healthy separations of existing business to
cope with the rapidly changing strategic environment, implying how much difficult it is
to sustain competitiveness in the business world over the time periods.
On the context of this thesis, ITT case would be the precedent model of the
breakup of conglomerate diversified with unrelated businesses and industries, while
AT&T would be the comprehensive textbook cases of breakups in regard to the dismissal
of horizontal and vertical integration.
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4. Korean Practices and Key Issues
Divestiture is still unusual practice in most Asian countries while that became
epidemic in the US and European countries. In many Asian countries, the businesses
believe that the size counts when it comes to the bargaining power with government to
get licenses of business or to go to the new business area. It had been quite true in Korea
until foreign currency crisis in 1997, the family controlled conglomerates, "Chaebol",
kept on diversifying into the unrelated industries with highly leveraged capital structure,
so there was virtually no concept of divestitures, even there were no spin-off provisions
in the Commercial Code. However, the crisis forced to change the practices drastically.
4.1 Foreign Currency Crisis and IMF Bailout in late 1990s
Asian Crisis Overall
Under the world economy system organized by OECD countries, there was
structurally long-run trend of US dollar depreciation against other major currencies since
1980's, which caused, consequently, weakness of Asian local currencies mostly pegged
with US dollar. That currency trend fueled the Asian export-oriented economies to over-
boom without proper adjustment in the long run, resulted in the highly leveraged
corporate sectors and over-consuming households through the bank credit expansion and
investment rushes into this region, all of which turned out to be rich background of
proliferation of conglomerates together with the socio-cultural contexts. Such vulnerable
economies with long-run accumulated deficits were easily led to insolvency of foreign
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currencies at the end when they were faced with the increasing pressure of redemptions in
matured debts and attacks of FX speculators.
Korean Crisis and Massive Restructuring - Introduction of Divestitures
At the end of 1997, overall debts to equity ratio of manufacturing sector in Korea
was reportedly 396.3% while its capital productivity was in a very low level compared
with that of international standard.3 0 With $8.2 billion annual deficit of current account
by losing labor-intensive products market of export to China, Korean entities, business
and banking sectors altogether, faced with a rush of demands asking redemptions of short
term debts, which resulted in shortage of foreign currency, consequently Korean
government ended up asking for IMF bailout packages in November 1997.
As results, Korean Won had to be significantly depreciated, interest rates
skyrocketed, and all of the asset values went down sharply, securities and real estates
altogether. On the other hand, there were series of corporate bankruptcies including the
conglomerates such as big five Chaebol, Daewoo and Hyundai, which resulted in the
devastation of banking sector with non performing loans.
To manage the crisis, the Korean government deployed emergency measures for
the massive restructuring of finance and corporate sectors as well as the general policies
to stabilize the macro-economic indicators. While shutting down the financial institutions
30 It was said Korea invested in best practice technology, however, failed to adopt quality management.
Consequently, the capital productivity of most of industry sectors were way lower than those of the US. For
example, in 1995, assuming 100 for the capital productivity of the US, that of Auto was 48, semiconductors
54, confectionery 39, and telecom 58. Only that of steel surpassed the US, which was 1 15. Martin Baily,
Chuong Do, Yong Sung Kim, William Lewis, Victoria Lee Nam, Vincent Palmade, and Eric Zitzewitz:
"The Roots of Korea's Crisis", Mckinsey Quarterly, 1998, Number 2
-31 -
and setting up the bad bank for NPLs, the government enforced the corporate players to
comply with the rigid disciplines as follows,
Enhancement of Capital Structure: Each corporation, or each conglomerate had to
lower their debt to equity ratio below 200%. They had either to sell their assets or to
increase their equity capital to meet the requirement of leverage ratio. Also the invitation
of foreign investors was strongly recommended.
Practice of Shareholders Capitalism: Corporate players were asked to implement
the key principles of shareholders capitalism, such practices as management transparency,
clear accounting rules and full disclosures, protection for the minority shareholders
Needless to say, those restructurings were accompanied with many changes and
reforms in laws and regulations, including the discussions on the divestitures, in order to
facilitate the possible spin-offs as one of the corporate restructuring instruments.
Afterwards
Fortunately, the large scale depreciation of FX helped the corporate sector to cash
their excess capacities by pushing out the inventories to the export market, and the above
mentioned government measures for the restructuring of corporate and financial sectors
paid off in the earlier time than generally expected.
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Table 7: Key Macro Figures of Korean Economy, 1997-2001
FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02(E)
Nominal GDP Growth 5.0% -6.7% 10.9% 9.3% 3.0% 6.0%
Current Account (USD Billion) (8,2) 40.4 24.5 12.5 8.6 10.0
Foreign Reserve (USD Billion) 20.4 52.0 74.0 96.2 102.8 117.0
Risk Free Rate 14.8% 7.2% 9.0% 6.8% 5.3% 5.0%
Debt to Equity Ratio 396.3% 303.0% 214.7% 210.6% 182.2% 135.0%(Manufacturing)
(Data: Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy)
Korean economy successfully escaped from the negative growth and the macro
indicators got back to almost normal by the year 2000. One of the most drastic changes
was the Leverage Ratio of Corporate Sector. The gearing currently came down to 1.3
from the almost 4.0 of 1997, which is now quite normal level of leverage level compared
with those of other OECD countries.
4.2 Divestiture Trends after Foreign Currency Crisis
Regulatory Aspects
As one of the regulatory reform in 1998 to cope with the flooding demands of
corporate restructuring, the new provisions of spin-off structure were introduced in
Commercial Code.3 ' Also the revision of Tax Codes granted the relevant tax relief for
the Spin-off structure to be tax-free transaction.
31 Until then, surprisingly, divestitures such as spin-off and carve-out structure with establishment of new
corporation had not been stated, only simple sales of assets or business units and share transfer were
feasible in line with the old Commercial Code
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The 30 Largest Conglomerates - Chaebol
Based on the regulatory supports mentioned above, fueled by the severe pressure
from the governmental window guidance asking financial soundness of corporate sectors,
the businesses, especially the conglomerates, started to sell, scrap or spin-off their
business units and its assets. They didn't have any other choice - it was a game of
survival, which was exactly the other direction of pre-IMF regime's diversification. The
conglomerate, so-called Chaebols, had to scrap or spin-off the money losing and
unrelated business units, desperately selling the non-operating extra assets on the other
hand. Those were to meet the financial leverage standard by repayment of debts, and
regain the confidence of their creditors and investors.
The following tables from the survey done by Federation of Korean Industries in
2001 illustrated number of divestiture cases between 1997 through 1 st half of 2001 in the
30 largest conglomerates, their key reasons, and the size of divestitures.3 2
Table 8: Divestitures, 30 largest Conglomerate (1997-2001.6) 33
Group No. of '97
Divesting
Samsung 16 0
Hyundai 12 36
LG 15 5
SK 11 3
Others 22 3
Total 76 47
'98 '99
115 29
27 18
18 51
11 11
7 15
178 124
'00 '01.6 Total
5 12 161
8 9 98
14 6 94
13 7 45
13 6 44
53 40 442
32 In Korean practice, they frequently use the concept of"30 largest conglomerates", so-called "Chaebol",
in accordance with the definition of "Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act" which has regulated the
business practices, financial structures, and M&A transactions of the top 30 largest Chaebol since 1980, so
the "30 largest Chaebol or conglomerate" is very common combined-word in Korea
33 Table 8-10, Keum Seung Yang: "Suggested Reform of Divestiture System for the Restructuring and
Innovations", CEO Report on Current Issue, FKI (The Federation of Korean Industries) CER 2001-20,
Page 9, October, 2001
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Table 9: Key Reasons of Divestitures
Driver Case Percentage
Scrapping Money Losing Business 4 0.9%
Restructuring of Human Resources 85 19.2%
Divesting Unrelated Business 104 23.5%
Divesting Medium to Small Scale Business 181 41.0%
Others 68 15.4%
Total 442 100.0%
Table 10: Size of Divestitures, (Number of Employees of Separated Companies)
Number of Employees Case Percentage
100 and below 345 78.1%
100 above- 300 below 63 14.3%
300 above- 1,000 below 17 3.8%
1,000 and above 17 3.8%
Total 442 100.0%
As above, unlike the conventional practice in Korea, the conglomerates unloaded
many of their business units and operations especially in 1998-1999 when they are under
the massive restructuring process. Also, noticeably, about two thirds of the entire cases,
the key purpose of the divestiture were the "focus" stated such as divesting unrelated
business and medium to small scale business.
However, 92.3% cases were small scale divestitures (the number of employees of
separated company were 300 or below) while the relatively large scale divestitures (the
number of employees of separated company were 1,000 or above) were only 17 cases,
which accounted for just 3.8%. Even though there have been some rather large and
symbolic cases, basically the divesting experiments of 30 largest Chaebol were mostly
limited to relatively small scale separations, not applying to the restructuring of its main
bodies. So, it was clear that conglomerates started to adopt divestitures as an option of
corporate reorganization to focus and concentrate their management resources towards
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key business operations, but still as a limited methodology passively applied to fix or
adjust their business portfolio partially.
Listed Companies
Most of sizable divestitures were implemented among the listed companies in the
stock market as the number of disclosures was stacked up over time, 1 1 cases in 2000, 18
cases in 2001, and 27 cases in 2002. It seemed the divestitures became fashion and
epidemic among the listed companies currently. 34
Daewoo Securities analyzed the completed 24 divestiture cases in 2002, and
classified the main purpose of divestitures into 4 categories as follows;
Type 1. Separating business units to improve the efficiency of each business
Type 2. Divesting the non-core business to focus on the core business
Type 3. Divesting to sell off the unprofitable unit to improve capital structure
Type 4. Divesting business units from the investment functions to construct transparent
corporate governance structure
Even though all of the divestitures were to achieve the enhancement of the
shareholder value in the end, the consequences were not always positive. In 2002, only
45.8% of the share prices of divestiture cases outperformed the market index, which
might imply that the divestitures were not necessarily accompanied with the enhancement
of shareholders value in Korea, however, the research covered only the short periods of
34 Interview comment: It was said that some of the demerger cases seemed to simply pursue just pricing
effects and were suspicious of price manipulation and insider trading. Sukrin Hong, Sr. Associate,
Disclosure Supervision, Financial Supervisory Board
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time especially in the very bearish market in year 2002.3 5 Therefore, it's too early to
conclude the correlation between divestitures and the enhancement of shareholders value
in general when considering the short history of introduction of divestitures in Korean
market. But the research revealed as illustrated below that the aftermath of Type 2 and 3
divestitures were relatively strong in terms of shareholders value, which needs tracing to
be proved in the future.
Table 11. Purposes of Divestitures, and Aftermath in 2002 36
Type Divesting Company No.of Outperform / No.of Co
Type 1 Tong Yang Confectionary, Deco, NSF 2 / 7
Namhae Chem, Shin Cheon, Growell Metal
Hyiundai Department Store
Type 2 Plenus, Cecrop, LG International Corp. 6 / 12
NC Soft, Finetec, Hyunjin Materials
HumanCom, Han Wha, NitGen Tech
Eagon Ind, NetSecure Tech, Korea Computer
Type 3 Namsun Aluminum, Hunex Inc 2 /2
Type 4 LGEI, LGCI, Daewoong 3 / 3
Total 11 / 24
* Underlined are the companies which outperformed the market index.
35 The research compared the share performances of individual stocks with the market index for the period
of between the board resolution date and November 29, 2002 respectively, and only I I out of 24 cases
turned out to outperform the market
36 Research mentioned above, Ki Lim Choi: "Research: the Impacts of Divestitures on the Enterprise
Value", Industry Analysis and Updates, Research Group, Daewoo Securities, December 6, 2002
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4.3 Combining Holding Company Structure with Divestiture, and Controversies in the
context of Corporate Governance
The regulatory reform to accelerate corporate restructuring after IMF crisis could
be segmented into following three dimensions,
Deregulation to facilitate diverse demands of corporate restructuring needs. Introduction
of the divestitures together with the enhancement of flexibilities in consolidation was
adopted in Commercial Code, Securities and Exchange Act, and Bankruptcy Acts.
Reinforcement of Corporate Governance to implement Shareholders Capitalism. Rigid
rules and disciplines to enforce management transparency and accountability, and
protection of minority shareholders were adopted in Commercial Code, Securities and
Exchange Act, and GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Rule).
Tax Relief or Cut to assist the restructuring. Taxes for most transactions in regard to the
massive restructuring of corporations were relieved or exempted by the amendments of
Corporate Tax Act, Income Tax Act, and Tax Cut Control Act.
In the midst of the regulatory reform, as a very complicated and controversial by-
product, the "Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act" ("FTA" hereafter) was amended
in 1999 to allow the formation of "Holding Company"("HC" hereafter) which had been
completely prohibited until then.
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Shown as Type 4, in 4.2 (Table 11), one of the top 5 Chaebol, LG, adopted HC
structure combining with divestitures in its reorganization, which attracted great public
attentions in capital market. Since HC's nature is very much new to the market and also
extremely versatile as a framework of corporate reorganization, it was said that HC
scheme may call for the shape of the future organizational structure of conglomerate in
Korea, bringing controversial issues in regard to corporate governance of Chaebol.
4.3.1 HC Practices in Western Countries and Japan
Western Countries
Most of western countries do not control or prohibit the HC directly. In case of the
US, they have controlled the banking and public utilities sectors in formation of HC. 37
Other than that, the possible problems under HC have been strictly regulated by the Anti-
trust laws, such as Sherman Act and Clayton Act, prohibiting any HC related practices of
horizontal and vertical restraints of trade, exclusive dealing, and tying arrangement. Same
are the UK and Germany regulating the issue indirectly through Anti-trust laws.
Also, the common practice is that the HC holds 100% of its affiliates' shares. For
example, General Electric's principal affiliates consolidated in the financial statement as
of December 31, 2002 were 52 companies, not surprisingly, GE held 100% share of 51
companies out of those 52,38 and only the HC has been listed on NYSE(New York Stock
37 Banking Holding Company Act of 1956, Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, Jun Ki Kim:
"Holding Company System and its Practice in Foreign Countries", PSPD (People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy) Conference, June 29, 1998
38 Annual report, General Electrics, Year 2002
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Exchange). In some countries, for example, Norway, they enforce HCs to hold 100% of
their affiliates' shares.39
Japan - Most Relevant but Different in Fundamentals
Until 1997, only Korea and Japan were the countries that prohibited HC including
new formation and transformation altogether. After World War II, the US occupation not
only disintegrated Japanese conglomerates traditionally controlled by the individual
family groups, but prohibited the HC by the legislation of Monopoly Regulation Act in
fear of the resurrection of the economic monster. Consequently, the family owned
conglomerates disappeared, and cross holding of the shares among the allied companies
and institutional investors had replaced the governance structure and been common
practice for decades.
Faced with the significant capital market downturn in 1990s resulting in the book
losses from the cross holdings, they resumed the discussion to activate the HC as one of
the solutions to cope with the crisis. After long debates, Japanese legislature amended the
Monopoly Regulation Act to allow the HC under the very rigid conditions in 1997. But
the largest corporations with certain amount of assets or above were still prohibited to
make or transform to HC, also so were the cases that may restrain the fair competitions or
cause concentration of economic wealth. Therefore, allowing the HC in Japan was
fundamentally to replace and restructure the prevailing cross holding schemes in the
financial crisis of the corporation, not to go back to the regime of conglomerates in the
World War II.
39 Jun Ki Kim: "Holding Company System and its Practice in Foreign Countries", PSPD (People's
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) Conference, June 29, 1998
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4.3.2 FTA and Government Practices in Korea
Since the legislation of FTA in 1981, Korean government body, Fair Trade
Commission ("FTC" hereafter) has served for two key public missions, (1) Prevention of
competition restraints and (2) Repression of the economic power concentration to
Chaebol.
For prevention of competition restraints, the FTA stipulates the instruments -
"restriction of combination of enterprises restraining competitions", and "prohibition of
inappropriate internal transactions".
For the repression of the economic power concentration to Chaebol, the FTA
designates "30 largest Chaebol" and their prohibited acts such practices "mutual capital
contribution"4 , "gross amount of investment over certain criteria"41 , and "formation of
Holding Company".4 2
4.3.3 Controversy on the HC
Chaebol's Arguments
Chaebols brought up the issue to allow the formation of HC in line with the
regulatory reform. Their arguments were
(1) HC structure would accelerate corporate restructuring in the invitation of foreign
investors. (*As a matter of fact, many of foreign investors asked Korean government to
40 It actually means the cross holding between the affiliates
41 It has raised many complaints and petitions from Chaebol who tried to diversify their business through
leverage. The limit has been moving around according to the economic situation in 25-40% range of the
net asset of the individual Chaebol. Currently it is 25% with some waivers
42 According to FTA, the HC is defined as a company controlling any domestic company's business
through the ownership of shares as its primary business, and whose total assets are above KRW 10 billion,
and affiliates' shares constitute more than 50% of its total assets
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allow the HC as prerequisite simply considering the convenience of the HC as investment
vehicle)
(2) HC would replace the conventional "Chairman's Staff Office" which had been
informal but very prevailing organization controlling the entire group affiliates. As the
realities and formalities match through HC, they argue that the structure of corporate
governance will significantly be improved through "alignment of the power and its legal
responsibility". 43
Critics Arguments
The critics against Chaebol, mostly the activist leaders, explicitly objected to the
agenda to allow the HC with the following arguments,
(1) The governance of the HC structure may deteriorate the minority shareholder rights
because they can't exercise the rights against the management of HC who actually
governs the company. The Chaebol's argument about the positive aspects of "alignment
of Chairman's power and responsibility" can be easily surpassed by the negative impacts
of undermining minority shareholders rights.44
(2) HC structure can be abused as an instrument of inheritance to the next generation of
Chaebol family in taking advantage of its tax saving scheme.4 5
(3) The adoption of HC will inevitably result in the concentration of wealth of Chaebol
by the financial leverage of the HC.46
43 The above Chaebol's stance was discussed in, Seung Ryong Park: "Functions of Fair Trade Act after
Massive Corporate Restructuring", Korea Research Institute, 1999
44 Sang Hoon Lee: "Implications to Corporate Law in the introduction of Holding Company System",
PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) Conference, June 29, 1998
45 It was said that the profitability of HC was very easy to manipulate so that the per share value in line with
tax code could be lowered in time of inheritance to save the relevant tax, and this effect could be
maximized by the financial leverage of the HC. Seung Su Ha: "Taxation Issues on Holding Company
System", PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) Conference, June 29, 1998
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In the PSPD (People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy) conference, held on
June 1998, they presented strong objection to the HC with compelling rationale. Also
about the arguments in regard to Japan as a precedent case allowing the HC in a similar
circumstance, they counter-argued that it was not the case because (1) Japan didn't allow
the HC for everyone, they prohibited largest corporations from doing it (2) Japan had
totally different backgrounds from Korea in terms of corporate governance, which meant
that there would be no chance that individual family owned conglomerate would emerge
again in Japan.
So, they finally insisted that, even in case of allowing HC, at least the FTA should
include the provisions of prohibition of HC for the 30 largest Chaebol, the prohibition of
financial leverage of HC, and compulsory 100% shareholding for its affiliates, stating all
of which were the minimal condition to prevent the excessive side effects of the HC.
Final Shape of FTA in Year 1999
Notwithstanding the controversies, the FTC finally drew the conclusion to allow
the HC with some constraints, key of which were,
(1) Debt-to-equity ratio must be below 100% following a one-year initial grace period,
(2) 30% or more stake is required in listed affiliates, and 50% or more in non-listed
(3) More than 50% of assets must be invested in subsidiaries with a two-year period
46 It was said that HC would be allowed certain level of leverage and it didn't necessarily have to own
100% of shares of its affiliates, also the HC wouldn't be regulated by the provision of gross amount of
investment limit, the concentration effect would be phenomenal in some cases. Ki Won Kim: "Problems in
the introduction of Pure Holding Company, and its Prerequisites", PSPD (People's Solidarity for
Participatory Democracy) Conference, June 29, 1998
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With the above criteria to minimize the side-effects, the FTC's final conclusion
was based on the rationales that the HC would drive the Chaebol to focus on their core
competence by facilitating the spin-offs and foreign investment altogether, which also
might help to reinforce the better transparency of corporate governance.4 7
There have been not many cases afterwards, however, they have brought many
issues into corporate finance practices in Korea for last a few years, and many of relevant
issues have been on discussion over time since the reform on FTA allowing the HC was
an experimental tryout. Needless to say, HC itself still remains in the prototype stage in
Korea and will be reviewed further in Chapter 5 with the LG cases.
47 Seung Ryong Park: "Functions of Fair Trade Act after Massive Corporate Restructuring", Korea
Research Institute, 1999
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5. Case Study: LG Group Demerger in Korea
5.1 LG Group
Founded by the Chairman's family and their partners in 1947, LG ventured its
business in the chemical products, and diversified into the electronics in late 1950s. Both
made a great success and LG became one of the leading business conglomerates in Korea.
As of the year end of 2001, LG positioned itself as 3rd largest Chaebol in terms of asset
size (2nd in terms of sales), whose affiliates accounted for 51 companies diversified into
telecommunication, retail, media, energy, and financial service.4 8
Table 12. Top 10 Conglomerates in Korea 49
(As of the Year End of 2001, Unit: USD billion)
No. ofName of Group AffiNiates Asset(a) Asset(b) Debts Equity Sales Neit D EAffiliates Profit (%)
1 KEPCO 14 75.7 75.7 31.7 44.0 26.0 2.4 72.1
2 Samsung 63 60.3 125.7 88.8 36.9 107.3 4.4 240.6
3 LG 51 45.4 59.1 39.9 19.3 66.6 1.4 206.8
4 SK 62 39.0 41.1 25.1 16.0 41.9 1.0 156.4
5 Hyundai Motors 25 34.4 39.2 24.6 14.6 38.3 2.4 168.0
6 KT 9 27.2 27.2 13.7 13.5 13.8 1.3 101.7
7 Korea Highway Co 4 22.0 22.0 11.0 11.0 2.0 0.0 100.4
8 Hanjin 21 18.0 20.2 15.1 5.1 12.7 -0.6 294.4
9 POSCO 15 17.4 17.4 7.2 10.2 13.2 0.8 71.0
10 Lotte 32 15.0 15.6 6.8 8.8 12.8 0.6 77.8
Among more than 50 group affiliates, LG Chemical and LG Electronics have been
the key business entities, maintaining the largest sales in the group, and carrying assets
which include the controlling investment shares of the key affiliate firms. The total assets
and sales of Chemical and Electronics accounted for 35% and 28% of group as table 13.
48 In Korean practice, they call all of the LG affiliates as "LG group"
49 Source: Press Release, Fair Trade Commission, April 1, 2002. Asset(a) excluded that of affiliate
financial institutions, while asset(b) included. Sales included that of financial institutions. The foreign
exchange rate of KRW/USD = 1,200
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Table 13. The Weight of LG Chemical and Electronics in LG Group
(As of the Year End 2001, Unit: KRW Million)
Company Assets(a) Sales
LG Chemical 50 7,477 6,016
LG Electronics 11,593 16,601
A: Sub Total 19,070 22,617
B : Group Total 54,484 79,966
A/B 35% 28%
In November 2000, LG Chemical astonished the capital market by the
announcement of its plan of the massive reorganization to spin-off into 3 entities, which
was followed by another spin-off of LG Electronics. Unlike the other divestitures after
IMF, those were so-called mega-breakup dismantling the controlling structure of a big 3
Chaebol of Korea.
5.2 Hypothesis 1: Drivers of Demerger Decision (Scopes)
It is generally said that "the LG demergers were strategically designed to address
the synthetic purpose of shareholders value and corporate control", which can be
discussed as follows separately,
Shareholders Value : Driver of Spin-off Decision
LG Chemical and LG Electronics couldn't be fairly valued due to the two key
restraints, which were
(1) the business portfolio themselves were too much diversified to be simply understood
by the outside investors. The LG Chemical and Electronics were running too many
different business divisions vertically and horizontally integrated. As illustrated in Table
50 LG Chemical is assumed to be before demerger, and the figures are the simple summation of the
separated companies
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14, LG Chemistry consisted of Petrochemicals, IB&M, EM, and variety of consumer
product lines. LG Electronics ran roughly four divisions such as multimedia, appliances,
display devices, and telecommunication equipment. So the covering analysts had to come
up with different comparables for each business to get comprehensive valuation.
However, market demands "focus", prefers "pure player", which mean that the investors
like to diversify themselves through portfolio, so they don't business to diversify on their
own.
(2) Both company had substantial amount of investment assets in the affiliates by which
they were faced with the concerns of investors on a daily basis regarding the "internal
capital market" and management transparency issues, also those assets significantly
deteriorated the financial performances of the firms in terms of such as ROIC and EVA.
Therefore, LG Chemical and LG Electronics shares had historically suffered from
the undervaluation of the capital market which penalized the complexity of business and
diversified investments. In that sense, LG had to spin-off themselves so that they could
separately win higher valuation as pure players, more attention from analysts and
investors, consequently unlock the intrinsic value of entire business portfolio.5 '
Corporate Control: Driver of HC Reorganization Decision
51 Interview comment: LG contemplated the divestitures from early 1990s with regard to the over-
diversification of its two major companies, and there has been internal debates how to reorganize the
businesses across the group affiliates to maximize the efficiencies. The demergers in last two years mostly
focused on the HC structure, so further spin-offs and mergers among group businesses and affiliates will be
actively considered to implement as the current HC structure settles down in the long run. Kisup Sung,
Executive Vice president, LG Corp
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As conventional business holding companies of LG group, it can be inferred that
LG Chemical and Electronics had faced with two key constraints in the corporate control
structure of the group, which were
(1) Dilution problem. As the companies grew over time, the controlling interests of
majority shareholders, the Chairman's family, were badly diluted to 11.25% and 16.17%
of total voting shares respectively as of the board resolution date of demerger. So, another
big round of equity funding or simple inheritance to next generation might imply the
disintegration of controlling stake of current majority.
(2) Compliance with FTA in gross amount of investment limit. It was announced that the
suspended rule restricting the gross amount of investment in domestic affiliate would be
applicable again in 2002, from which many Chaebol had suffered for decades in their
ways to diversification. It was obvious that LG would have hard time to comply with the
FTA, and highly likely would lose some of its controlling stakes of affiliates on the way.
So, it needed the solution to create the new corporate control structure to protect the
majority shareholders from further dilution, as well as to meet the criteria of FTA. The
breakthrough structure to make both issues clear was the HC solution which could
enhance the corporate control of the majority shareholders through the reorganization and
be waived from the enforcement of gross amount of investment limit. 52
52 In some references, the concept of "Corporate Control" is sometime mixed up with that of "Corporate
Governance". HC may enhance the control of majority, however, it doesn't necessarily mean to enhance
the corporate governance. It will be discussed further in 5.4.2 and 5.5.
*Also the limit of gross amount of investment is currently 25% of the Net Assets, and it is applied for the
entire companied belonged to top 30 Chaebol, but the HC is exempted from the application. Instead, the
HC is regulated by the mandatory limit of Debt-to-Equity ratio
*Fund managers and analyst perception on the LG cases whether to improve the Corporate Governance are
pervasively neutral according to the interviews.
*Interview comment: Even though the internal discussion on demergers started from the simple separation,
it encountered with the corporate control and FTA compliance issues after all. So entire transaction
structure was designed to serve those purpose. Kisup Sung, Executive Vice president, LG Corp
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5.3 Hypothesis 2: Key "Smart Alchemy" Components of Transaction (Methodologies)
It is possibly said that "the LG demergers were strategically designed to leverage
the regulatory structures and market price mechanism at maximum in their transactions",
which can be attributed to the key "smart alchemy" components in the formation of the
HC with spin-offs.
5.3.1 Summary of the Transaction
Grand Picture: the Spin-offs and Merger
LG started restructuring with the breakup of LG Chemical into three separate entities in
April 2001, which was followed by another small breakup from one of it in August 2002.
Table 14. The Separating Entities from LG Chemical
Company Divesting and Divested Business
LG CI Investment Holdings for the group affiliates
(Chemical Investment) Life Science division
LG Chemical Petrochemicals, Industrial and Building Materials (IB&M)
Electronics Materials (EM)
LG H&H Dominant market player in consumer chemical products:
(Household & Health Care) Cosmetics, Toothpaste, Shampoo, Detergent, Soap
LG Life Science Additional Breakup from LGCI
In April 2002, LG Electronics followed LG Chemical to break itself into two entities,
Table 15. The Separating Entities from LG Electronics
Company Divesting and Divested Business
LG EI Investment Holdings for the group affiliates:
(Electronics Investment) LG Electronics and Telecom Affiliates
(LGT, DACOM, Hanaro)
LG Electronics Multimedia, Appliance, Telecom Equipment
And Strategic Joint Venture Shares
(LG IBM, LG Philips, LG Hitachi)
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Finally, the HCs, LGCI and LGEI merged to form the grand HC of the LG group in
March 2003.
Table 16. Spin-offs and Merger to LG Corp
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1 t Step: Split of Business/Financial Statement/Legal Entity, and Re-listing
Spin-offs were designed to serve the fundamental agenda of "focus and
concentration" of the business together with the value maximization upon re-listing, so
the most significant strategic aspect of the spin-offs was to break the investment
management sectors53 from the pure business sectors to let the business affiliates focus
on their own core businesses. Under that principle, LG Chemical and Electronics spun-
off their business operations as new corporations, consequently the left-over portions
were to form themselves as pure Holding Companies.
53 It refers to mostly controlling shareholdings of affiliates
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Under those strategic designs how to divest the originals into multiple entities, the
legal and formal split process was followed in line with the law and regulations. In those
processes, the key structural issue was how to split the assets and liabilities. Under the
current regulatory framework, there has been virtually no relevant restriction how to split
the financial statement. Only some of the leverage ratio issues were carefully considered
such as the FSB's(Financial Supervisory Board) window guidance that the bank would
monitor the corporate sectors to keep the debt-to-equity ratio 200% or below, and the
FTA's criteria that the HC would maintain the debt-to-equity ratio 100% or below.
Therefore, in split of financial statement, the divesting entities, the candidates of
HC should obtain superior financial structure to the separating business entities
considering the regulatory requirements of debt-to-equity ratio.5 4
* Split of Assets and Liabilities
Table 17. The Split of Financial Statement, LG Chemical upon Demerger (In Wm)
Divesting Entity LG CI LG Chem LG H & H
Asset 6,171,067 2,153,023 3,474,532 543,512
100.0% 34.9% 56.3% 8.8%
Debts 3,890,693 1,214,233 2,314,420 362,040
100.0% 31.2% 59.5% 9.3%
Shr Equity 2,280,374 938,790 1,160,112 181,472
100.0% 41.2% 50.9% 8.0%
Paid In Cap 553,684 99,663 365,432 88,589
No. of Common Shr 97,613,734 17,570,473 64,425,064 15,618,197
No. of Preferred Shr 13,123,108 2,362,160 8,661,251 2,099,697
(Demerger Ratio) 0.18 0.66 0.16
Equity Surplus 1,726,690 839,127 794,680 92,883
Debt to Equity Ratio 170.6% 129.3% 199.5% 199.5%
54 Interview comment: Unlike the merger rule, there is no principle on the demerger in splitting the
financial statement and valuation in regard to it. So FSB has contemplated to address this issue in the
revision of relevant provisions of Securities and Exchange Act. Sukrin Hong, Senior Associate, Disclosure
Supervision, Financial Supervisory Board
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In case of LG Chemical Demerger, the HC candidate, LG CI, was assigned with
41% of the shareholders equity while receiving only 31% of the liability so that the debt-
to-equity ratio of LG CI approached to the legal requirement of 100%,55 and the assigned
number of shares were merely 18% of the outstanding, which implied the LG CI would
have quite high per share values in terms of BPS (Book Per Share). This arrangement
seemed to be obviously based on the calculations to meet minimum requirements of debt-
to-equity ratio of business affiliates, LG Chem and H&H, which were set to have that
ratio almost exactly 200% as results.
Table 18. The Split of Financial Statement, LG Electronics upon Demerger (In Wm)
Divesting Entity LG El LG Electronics
Asset 12,297,215 2,224,770 10,072,445
100.0% 18.1% 81.9%
Debts 7,722,171 715,777 7,006,394
100.0% 9.3% 90.7%
Shr Equity 4,575,044 1,508,993 3,066,051
100.0% 33.0% 67.0%
Paid In Cap 1,031,068 247,107 783,961
No. of Common Shr 155,118,070 15,511,807 139,606,263
No. of Preferred Shr 19,095,547 1,909,555 17,185,992
(Demerger Ratio) 0.10 0.90
Equity Surplus 3,543,976 1,261,886 2,282,090
Debt to Equity Ratio 168.8% 47.4% 228.5%
In case of LG Electronics Demerger which followed the LG Chemical case year
later, the split structuring was much more to the direction to meet the regulatory
requirement as seen in the Table 18. The HC candidate, LG EI, took 33% of shareholders
equity while receiving only 9.3% of the liability, resulting in only 47% of debt-to-equity
55 In FTA, the company has one year grace period to meet the ratio
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ratio, and the assigned number of shares were such a minimal level of 10%, which would
increase the BPS at the possible maximum level.
* Setting Base Price for Re-listing
Upon the de-listing of the original divesting company, the base prices for re-listing
of all the separated entities were calculated by the market capitalization of the last trading
date proportionally to the BPS of each entities, and KSE (Korea Stock Exchange)
announced that the separated entities would be re-listed on a certain day by the base price
calculated accordingly.
Table 19 illustrates LG Chemical case how to calculate base price for re-listing.
The last day market capitalization of the de-listing entity was spread out to three new
entities according to the shareholders equity basis, and the per share prices were
calculated by the outstanding shares allocated.
As already mentioned, the DE ratio and BPS were favorably designed for the HC,
LG CI, so the re-listing base price was naturally the highest among the three. In regard to
the fact that many institutional investors didn't have appetite to invest in the HC, it was
intuitively foreseeable that the share price of the HC would be hovering way under the
base price just set by per share NAV of the book. So, as in the Table 19, the post
demerger share price in two months of LG CI, the HC, was only about 30% of the base
price, while the share price of LG Chem and LG H&H rose to 177% and 466%
respectively.
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Table 19. The Base Price upon Re-listing, and Aftermath, LG Chemical
As stipulated regarding the figures in Table 19, DE ratio of LG EI was more
favorably designed than the LG Chemical case, therefore, the post demerger share price
in two months was only 24% of the base price of demerger, while the share price of new
LG Electronics rose to 143% of the base price in as illustrated in Table 20 below despite
the paralleling bearish market.
Table 20. The Base Price upon Re-listing, and Aftermath, LG Electronics (In Wm)
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Divesting Company Common Preferred
Last Market Price 12,700 5,760 ( As of Mar 28, 2001)
Market Capitalization 1,239,694 75,589
Distributed Market Cap. Divesting Entity LG Cl LG Chem LG H&H
Common 1,239,694 510,360 630,679 98,655
Preferred 75,589 31,119 38,455 6,015
(Market Capitalization) 1,315,284 541,479 669,134 104,670
Distributed Prices per Share upon Re-listing In line with BPS
Common 29,046 9,789 6,317
Preferred 13,174 4,440 2,865
Relisted Price, as of April 25, 2001 21,326 13,000 13,000
Market Price, as of Jun 29, 2001 (Common) 8,571 17,300 29,450
Divesting Company Common Preferred
Last Market Price 45,000 25,800 ( As of Mar 27, 2001)
Market Capitalization 6,980,313 492,665
Distributed Market Cap. Divesting Entity LG El LG Electronics
Common 6,980,313 2,302,326 4,677,987
Preferred 492,665 162,496 330,169
(Market Capitalization) 7,472,978 2,464,823 5,008,156
Distributed Prices per Share upon Re-listing In line with the BPS
Common 148,424 33,508
Preferred 85,096 19,212
Relisted Price, as of April 22, 2002 149,500 64,400
Market Price, as of Jun 29, 2002 35,400 48,000
(In Wm)
2nd Step: Share SWAP to form the HC
The shapes of restructuring were completed by the formation of the Holding
Companies, so the shareholding structures of the HC candidates, LG CI and LG EI, had
to be restructured in line with the requirements set by FTA. (See Table 21, The Structure
of SWAP)
* LG Chemical
The HC candidate, in case of LG CI, had to purchase its affiliates' shares to meet
the FTA criteria of minimum 30% in case of listed ones. The basic solution was
swapping shares with the majority shareholders, the Chairman's family, who owned the
LG Chem and H&H as results of previous demerger. So, LG CI pulled out a tender offer
to solicit of selling LG Chem, H&H, and Home Shopping shares in exchange of LG CI
shares in capital increase, and the Chairman's family fully subscribed all shares to the
tender.56
The entire SWAP process was that the Chairman's family materialized its majority
control over the HC as the HC restructured itself as legitimate Holding Company
according to FTA simultaneously. As results, the interest of Chairman's family reached
41% in LG CI as of Dec 31, 2001, 57 and the LG CI added significant stakes of its
affiliates in addition to existing shares from the demerger.58
56 It was previously determined to do so before the implementation of demerger
57 It would be more than 45% if considering the shares held by affiliates and treasury
58 Since the old entity owned 6.7% of the treasury shares and those were not split upon demerger, the
breakup transaction automatically created the 6.7% share position of LG CI into its affiliates. The detailed
leverage structures regarding the treasury shares and pricing structure will be further analyzed in 5.3.2
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Table 21. The Structure of SWAP, LG Chemical
Before SWAP
SWAP
"................................................................
Tender Offer w/CI Shares
Chairman's Family
11.3% Each
i LG Chem, LG H&H,
I LG Home Shopping Shrs
After SWAP
As of Dec 31, 2001
Chairman's Family
40.7%
LG H&H Home Shopping
* As illustrated, the final interest of Chairman's family over LG CI was not solely
contributed by the swapped LG Chem and H&H shares. They additionally granted the
LG Home Shopping shares in exchange of LG CI, also some of the cashes in the previous
capital increase. In Aug 2002, LG CI spun-off the it small business operation, LG Life
Science, which was too small to count it in the main contexts.
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* LG Electronics
In the 2 d step of restructuring of LG Electronics, the process and structure of
SWAP and the formation of the HC were identical to LG Chemical except the fact that it
broke up into just two separate entities, which was virtually separating the controversial
investment management sectors from the core businesses. As the consequences of the
SWAP and formation of the Holding Company, the interest of Chairman's family
reached 63% in LG EI as of Sep 30, 2002. 59 and the LG EI almost achieved the FTA
requirement of minimum shareholding to LG Electronics.
5.3.2 Structural Analysis of Transaction: Two Key Components - "Smart Alchemy"
As reviewed in 5.3.1, the LG demergers were not simple breakups, but had to come
up with the HC structure in line with FTA together with the enhancement of the
controlling stake of majority shareholders. To implement those multiple purposes, LG
designed and installed two key "smart alchemy" components into the transaction
structure which LG took advantage of extensively - Treasury Shares and Leverage
Scheme.
Treasury Shares: Framework of the HC
Both of the old divesting entities had substantial amount of treasury shares as of the
board of resolution date for demerger as belows,
Company Stake Reason of purchase
LG Chemical 6.7% Market Purchase to stabilize the market price
LG Electronics 9.8% Market Purchase / Merger with subsidiary
59 It would be more than 77% if considering the shares held by affiliates and treasury
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In split of the financial statement, the treasury shares were not necessarily divided
into the separating entities, so those were designed to entirely belong to the HC
candidates. Also in demerger process, the treasury shares were split into the different
shares in accordance with the demerger ratios. In that way, LG CI, the HC candidate,
were able to automatically obtain 6.7% of stake in the separating entities, LG Chem and
H&H. Same happened in LG EI, obtaining 9.8% of LG Electronics upon demerger itself.
Since the HC were to meet the minimum 30% stake requirement of its affiliates, splitting
the treasury shares were the very starting point to comply with it, and also very much
reduced the HC's future purchase burden of affiliates. 60
Leverage Scheme: Alchemy of Creating Controlling Block in the HC
As reviewed in 5.3.1, the split of financial statement in demerger was intentionally
designed to lower the DE ratio of the HC candidate while maximizing the per share net
asset value, BPS. So the theoretical re-listing base price of the HC candidate was set to
the abnormally high level while the business affiliates were way understated so that the
share price of the HC candidate plunged from the base price significantly while the share
price of the affiliates skyrocketed.
The thing was that this post demerger pricing was definitely reflected in the SWAP
processes as the subscription price of the HC shares and the tender prices of the affiliate
shares. The HCs, LG CI and LG EI's subscription prices in swapping were merely 23.9%
and 12.1% of the base price upon the re-listing, and this pricing scheme created much
leverage for the majority shareholders to extend their controlling stakes in the HCs. The
60 Interview comment: It was obvious that the treasury shares substantially contributed to ease off the
burden to cope with FTA, worked as framework of HC structure. Kisup Sung, Executive Vice president,
LG Corp
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Table 22 below is to estimate the leverage effect of the pricing scheme of swap, assuming
the majority shareholders, mostly Chairman's Family, would have held the original
shares in demerger and subscribed the tender fully to exchange their affiliates to the HCs
by the given prices. The results were that theoretically they could have enhanced their
controlling stake by 3.1x and 4.3x in LG CI and LG EI respectively compared with those
in the original entities. 61
Table 22. The Leverage of Controlling Stake through the SWAP
LG Chemical
Upon Demercer
Outstanding Shares
Chairman Family
% Holdings
(Base Price upon Relisting)
(Market Price in two months)
Old Chemical
97,613,734
10,983,533
11.3%
Upon Capital Increase, Cl
Family Subscription
(Subscription)
Outstanding after
Chairman Family
% Holdings
Upon Tender SWAP
(Tender Pricing)
Tender Value (Wm)
No of Cl Shares
No of Cl Shares of Family
Outstanding after SWAP
% Holdings
LEVERAGE
Cl
17,570,473
1,977,036
11.3%
Chemical
64,425,064
7,249,132
11.3%
H&H
15,618,197
1,757,365
11.3%
7S7 _4~8~14> As of 03/28/01
As of 06/29/01
1,736,223 Shrs
8,681 Wm
37,570,473
3,713,259
9.9%
¢.-~~~s~~~~t >K 3i As of 1 1/08/01
123,960 53,441
17,887,468 7,711,613
29,312,340
94,770,135
30.9%
3.1
61 Interview comment: The entire transaction structure was intentionally designed to take advantage of the
"leverage" effect to improve the controlling stake of the Chairman's family in the HC. Kisup Sung,
Executive Vice president, LG Corp
*Interview comment: The leverage effect was more than the simple calculation in senses that (l)the most
of the quality assets were deliberately allocated to HC (2)the treasury shares were assigned to HC which
eventually resulted in the understatement of the shareholders equity of HC. Stanley Jo, Sr. Fund Manager,
Hyundai Investment Trust Management
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LG Electronics
Upon Demerqer
Outstanding Shares
Chairman Family
% Holdings
(Base Price upon Relisting)
(Market Price in two months)
Upon Tender SWAP
(Tender Pricing)
Tender Value (Wm)
No of El Shares
No of El Shares of Family
Outstanding after SWAP
% Holdings
LEVERAGE
Old Electronics
155,118,070
27,510,131
17.7%
El
15,511,807
2,751,013
17.7%
Electronics
139,606,263
24,759,118
17.7%
14$A42 7. 3W3, 0NEW 48,c,0o
1,230,528
68,744,590
71,495,603
92,865,192
77.0%
4.3 
As of 03/27/02
As of 06/29/02
As of 07/23/02
(*The real transactions basically followed identical courses as shown above, however,
there were some deviations, for example, such as cash in and out in realities, so the real
consequences of SWAP were somewhat different from the results of above table)
Mostly thanks to the leverage from the smart split of financial statement and the
SWAP pricing scheme, the controlling stakes in the HCs reached the highest level of
listed companies. In March 2003, the two HCs merged and virtually formed the group
HC, named LG Corporation, and not surprisingly the controlling block of LG family
accounted for 65.3% of total outstanding, including 17% treasury shares, and 10.4%
owned by affiliates according to the current FSB filing. 62
On the other hand, the SWAP created the shareholding structure of the HC, in case
of LG Chemical as shown the Table 23, purchasing the affiliates shares in the tender by
the issuance of new shares. Based on the former interest which was from the treasury
shares of the old company, the HC could extend its shareholdings into affiliates, LG
62 Interview comment: If includes the treasury shares purchased from the shareholders who objected to the
merger transaction according to the Commercial Code, the total stake goes up to around 80%. Theoretically
LG has to consider the "going private" of the HC in regard to the market valuation as well as the
percentage of the shares, but doesn't really have any intention to implement it considering the side effects.
Kisup Sung, Executive Vice president, LG Corp
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Chem, LG H&H, and LG Home Shopping, to 21%, 25%, and 30% respectively. Those
level of interest approached the criteria of minimum 30% set by the FTA.
Table 23. The SWAP and Consequences in Formation of the HC, LG Chemical (In Wm)
Board Resolution
Record Date
Subscription 11
Price per Share (WV)
Paid In Capital after transaction
Common
Preferred
Te
LG Chemistry
LG Household & Health
LG Home Shopping
(Total)
LG Chemistry
LG Household & Health
LG Home Shopping
(Total)
11/08/01
12/21/01
/26/01 - 12/5/01
6,930
nder Price / Shr
17,100
30,400
54,800
lo of SWAP-CI
26,518,907
15,118,503
15,562,251
57,199,662
Identical to Tender Period
Offered Price of Cl
485,661
94,770,135
2,362,160
s
s
No. Tendered
17,636,000
4,276,000
1,968,000 /
Cl's -Before
1,040,000
hrs
hrs
Su cribed
'0,747,1 36
3,446,422
1,968,000
Cl's -After
15,037,136
4,486,422
1,968,000
From "Treasury"
Sub. Amount
183,776
104,771
107,846
396,394
Cl' Share %
20.6%
25.3%
30.0%
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5.4 Hypothesis 3: Economic Consequences (Assessment)
It is said that "LG demergers enhanced shareholders value and improved the
corporate governance". The hypothesis must be tested or assessed separately.
5.4.1 Aspects of Shareholders Value
In terms of Market Capitalization
The simplest way of testing whether the demerger enhanced the shareholders value
is to see if the total market capitalization has been increasing after the demerger.
(Absolute Performance) More specific and scientific approach would be the comparison
of the post demerger market price with the major market index. (Relative Performance)
* LG Chemical
As shown in exhibit 2, it looks intuitively obvious the market capitalization of LG
Chemical was boosted by the demerger, however, there was some time lag.
Exhibit 2. The Trend of Market Capitalization upon Demerger, LG Chemical
.Total Market Valuation, L Che'mical I(Pre and Post Denierger In Wbn)
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
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(*The post demerger Market Capitalization is the simple summation of those of the
separating entities)
Upon the announcement of old LG Chemical on November 15, 2000, the stock
market didn't react simultaneously and it took about almost 10 months for the share price
to take off upwards. The market needed time to decipher the spin-off structures with the
HC, which was definitely unfamiliar to most of the market players, and also to digest and
overcome the controversies and skepticism.
But the big jump period of price, between October 2001 to March 2002, was
exactly overlapped with the overall bullish market, so the relative price performance has
to be reviewed.
Exhibit 3. Relative Performance of LG Chemical and KOSPI, Jan 2000 - Jan 2003
Relative Performance of LG Chemical and KOSPI (From Jan 2000 to Jan 2003)
,j . ' . . :. ' - 1
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
(*KOSPI : Korea Stock Price Index. Market Capitalization of LG Chemical and KOSPI
on January 4, 2000 were assumed as at 100.0 respectively)
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Exhibit illustrates that the share price had been underperformed the market Index in
the year 2000-2001 period reflecting the complexity of diversified business portfolio and
poor corporate governance. However, upon completion of the demerger, the share price
of LG Chemical have clearly outperformed the market Index afterwards.
* LG Electronics
As shown Exhibit 4, it also quite obvious that demerger boosted share price of LG
Electronics. But, unlike the LG Chemical case which was the precedent case year earlier,
the share price started to move upon the announcement, not upon the completion of the
transaction. It seemed simply because the "Study Effect by the precedent case" drove the
market price under the assumption that the follow-up case would be on the same positive
direction.
Exhibit 4. Trend of Market Capitalization upon Demerger, LG Electronics
Total M:arket Valuation - LG Eectronics (Pre and Post Demerger, In Wbn)
- - ; H .~.~' - , "- ~ -,',~'~: .. ~ .-::~ ~-:::: .
=-
~ ~.... , :, .:- - , . . . .-.. : :
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
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Exhibit 5. Relative Performance of LG Electronics and KOSPI, Jan 2000 - Jan 2003
Relative Performance of LG Electronics and KOSPI (From Jan 2000 to Jan 2003)
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
(*KOSPI : Korea Stock Price Index. Market Capitalization of LG Electronics and KOSPI
on January 4, 2000 were assumed as at 100.0 respectively)
Same as LG Chemical case, LG Electronics demerger also made a material
momentum change in market price, shifting underperformance to outperformance of the
market Index.
So, it was quite clear that the LG demergers enhanced shareholders value in terms
of market capitalization - both in absolute relative performance.
In terms of Financial Performance
As discussed in 2.6, the enhancement of market capitalization in demerger must be
justified by the improvement of financial performance in the long run, otherwise the
inflated value will be retrieved.
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Table 24. below illustrates the financial performances of related LG entities since
the year 1997 to date. (The shaded portion indicates the numbers of post-demerger, and
the underlined are the simple summation of the numbers of affiliates, not the numbers
from consolidation according to GAAP)
We can possibly say that the accounting profit, NPAT, has been improving through
demergers, however, can't say how much it came from the demerger. 63 Looking at the
EVA, it is more obvious that the demergers improved the profitability.6 4
In terms of MVA, both LG Chemical and Electronics came out of the negative
numbers after all in 2002, which could be interpreted as the direct result of the
demergers.6 5
Therefore, it is quite defendable argument that the LG demergers, in the relatively
short run, enhanced shareholders value in terms of financial performances in such as
NPAT, EVA, and MVA, yet, the long run consequences have to be monitored to firmly
support the hypothesis.
63 Interview comments: The strong performance of LG Chemical, however, can be partially attributed to
the robust market situation of the industry, not only by demerger itself. Daeyong Park, Senior Analyst,
Research Center, Hyundai Securities
64 Most of EVA numbers are smaller than the NPAT numbers over time, implying that the companies have
suffered from the over-diversified investments
65 The aggregated MVA number of LG Chemical in 2002 is smaller than that of EVA number, since the LG
CI destroyed MVA significantly while the business entities - LG Chem, H&H, and Life Science - created
multiples in MVA/EVA. This implies the severe under-valuation of the HC and one of the main causes of
so-called "Korean Discount" in the capital market
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Table 24. The financial performance of LG Chemical and LG Electronics,
NPAT, EVA and MVA During the 1997-2002 (In Wbn)
NPAT (Net Profit After Tax)
97 98 99 00 01 02
LG Chemical (Divesting) 6.4 53.6 367.7 324.8 1
LG Cl 12i
LG Chem 1 3 3453
LG H&H 5.44. 
LG Life Science
LG Electronics (Divesting) 9.2 112.0 2,005.0 502.0 507.0 593.5
LG El 315.8
LG Electronics -277.7
EVA (Economic Value Added)
97 98 99 00 01 02
LG Chemical (Divesting) (188.0) (850) 122.2 86.5 31 450.8
LG Cl .
LG Chem .' 30i.0
LG H&H 19.'9 6 i.1
LG Life Science 
LG Electronics (Divesting) 187.7 (138.3) 1,819.0 607.2 369.9 488.5
LG El - 235.1
LG Electronics 2... 53.4
MVA (Market Value Added)
97 98 99 00 01 02
LG Chemical (Divesting) (964.1) (514,5) 1,671.8 1 330.7 64' 
LG Chem
LG Chem Si'256. 1,4155
LG H&H 24 - 338.2
LG Life Science .9
LG Electronics (Divesting) (655.2) (406. 1) 2,618.6 (1,728. ) 6,449.0 1,598 1
LG El
LG Electronics 3,228.1
About Table 24.
* The EVA and MVA calculations followed the standard formula suggested by Professor
Peter Joos, Sloan School of Management, MIT
* The EVA data provided by the research institutions in Korea implied that they used
quite different formula and ingredients of Invested Capital to calculate EVA, which
basically excluded the investments to their affiliate companies. The analysts had
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legitimate arguments that most of large Korean companies were assuming holding
company position (not the legal HC under FTA) while doing its conventional business.
So the substantial amount of investments would significantly deteriorate the EVA
numbers if those were simply included in the Invested Capital. They insisted that
adoption of the US formula shouldn't be appropriate due to the differences of accounting
rules and practices. In that sense, even though it wasn't compelling, there were some
chances that the EVA and MVA numbers in Table 24 understated the real economic
consequences.
* WACC numbers of the companies were imported from the "Annual Korean Company
Handbook", which has been updated annually by co-working research institutes.
* Ke (Cost of Equity): On the appropriate Market Premium, I had several conference
calls to consult with the strategist and analysts in Seoul, and concluded to use the
followings over the time period. Also on the Risk Free Rate, the fixed income specialist
recommended the 1 year maturity MSB (Monetary Stabilization Rate, Bank of Korea)
rate to cover the entire period cohesively. On the Beta, I found that market research
institutes adopt 1 year volatility data for Beta, which seemed obviously had some limited
statistical meanings, however, I imported the data of 3rd quarter 2002 from the same
source of WACC and used it to cover the entire 5 year period. The Components for the
Computation of Cost of Equity were,
FY 97 FY 98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Remarks
Rf 14.8% 7.2% 9.0% 6.8% 5.3% MSB rate, year end
Rm- Rf 15.0% 3.0% 13.0% 13.0% 12.0% Analyst Opinion
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5.4.2 Improvement of Corporate Governance
It is said that "LG demerger improved the corporate governance", which has been
on long discussions separately from the shareholders value point of view. In plain spin-
offs, nothing would have to do with corporate governance, but the management
efficiency would be the only concerns.
However, the LG demergers were further shaped with the HC structure of which
featured phenomena were (1) dismantled ownership structure, creating indirect control
through the HC (2) increased controlling block of the HC by Chairman's Family (3) dual
listing of the HC and affiliate.66
Basically, it was obvious that those transactions enhanced the controlling of the
majority shareholders, but it didn't necessarily mean the improvement of corporate
governance.6 7 The following points were discussed in regard to corporate governance
aspects of the LG demergers.
Positive Aspects of the Transaction Consequences
(1) The alignment between the realities and legal entity is said to be the most noticeable
products of the transactions. Before that, it was truly at least a moral problem in that the
Chairman's staff office performed the HC functions without legal presence, so it had so-
66 Dual listing refers to the situation that the HC and its affiliates are listed together in the stock market. It's
quite unusual in line with the global practice and theoretically a bit grey although it is allowed according to
regulations in Korea.
*Interview comment: Korean government fully realizes the characteristics of dual listing and its
uniqueness. Ingyoo Park, Deputy Director, Antitrust Bureau, Fair Trade Commission/Sukrin Hong, Senior
Associate, Disclosure Supervision, Financial Supervisory Board
67 Interview comment: About this point, most of the market players, the fund manager and analysts, agreed
on the argument unanimously
*Moreover, basically the HC is not receptive to market players who are in support of shareholders
capitalism, because they think the HC creates "corporate group" which is inevitably accompanied with
"internal capital/resource market" issue. In that perspective, the HC is the regressive form of corporate
governance. Seung II Jung: "Industrial Policy, where is it supposed to go to", Position 21, Progress
Network, Conference, March 14, 2003
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called superpower to make major managerial decisions but didn't have any liabilities. So
the argument is that the transactions at least removed the discrepancy. 68
(2) Some argue that the autonomy of management in the affiliates companies was
reinforced because the individual majority shareholders would control the affiliates only
indirectly through the HC, and the management was set free from the non-core
managerial issues regarding the "group".
(3) Since the dividends are almost the only revenue source of the HC, they are supposed
to push the affiliates paying more dividends to the shareholders. Needless to say, it has
become common to pay more dividend than ever among the affiliates that belonged to the
HC, which used to be not the customary practice.
Some Deficiencies of the Structure
(1) The greatest concern is that the Chairman's Family and its affiliates finally holds too
high percentage of shares in the HC, say way over than 50% in the end, which stipulates
the clear control of the HC directly and the affiliates indirectly by the absolute majority
voting power.6 9
(2) At the same time, the HCs have suffered, and definitely will suffer from the severe
under-valuation in the market, in that sense the majority shareholders had to and will give
up some wealth in terms of share price in exchange of the corporate control
68 Interview comments : It is mostly true. The relevant policymakers realize that it isn't best solution,
however, they argue that it is still much better than the Chaebol's conventional complicated controlling
structure since the transformation simplifies the shareholding structure of the affiliates disconnecting
insolvency risks each other as well as the alignment issue. Ingyoo Park, Deputy Director, Antitrust Bureau,
Fair Trade Commission.
*Exactly same argument as FTC. Kisup Sung, Executive Vice president, LG Corp
69 Interview comment: The transaction was designed to maximize the controlling stakes over the HC to
cope with the future dilution in regard to the limited financial capabilities of the Chairman's family. Kisup
Sung, Executive Vice president, LG Corp
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(3) There would be some constraints of minority shareholders' rights coming from the
dual listing structure of HC and its affiliate, which is further discussed in 5.5
(4) Also there would be a strategic conflict between the controlling stakeholders and
growth itself, which is further discussed in 5.5.
Set aside the positive aspects, the deficiencies themselves seemed to be not so
serious issues, however, it can be a totally different story when they try to answer
whether LG's HC model would be sustainable, and so could be the Chaebol's basic
future structure of corporate control in Korea.
5.5 Hypothesis 4: Future Model of Corporate Control
It can be said that "LG's HC model would be the typical and prevailing corporate
control structure of Chaebols in Korea in the future", and the new Minister of FTC
mentioned currently that he strongly recommend the Chaebols to restructure themselves
into the HC system.
However, the uniqueness of the LG's HC model distinguishing itself from the
common practice is holding back the conclusion. The LG's HC model can be possibly
defined,
Incomplete Separation, Just Reorganization
In the transition to the HC system, the business entity has to go through the spin-off,
but the separating entities must be consolidated under the controlling of the HC. In
principle, it won't be a pure separation but just the reorganization of corporate control.
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In summary, involving the HC structure makes Korean breakup cases totally
different from the divestitures of the western world. As reviewed in 3.3, the series of the
spin-offs of AT&T over the last two decades, regardless of its compelling drivers, were
simple and complete separation in terms of corporate control despite some of the
remaining relationship for the brand and marketing synergies. Even the breakup case of
ITT in 3.2, the largest US conglomerate, was just a complete separation to fix the
problems of over diversification resulting in the historical end of conglomerate in the US.
So under the incomplete form of separation, (1) the enhancement of managerial
autonomy in the business affiliates is possibly uncertain as long as the majority
shareholders maintain the absolute majority voting power over the HC. (2) Moreover, the
chances for the minority shareholders of the affiliates to challenge the management of the
HC is very slim due to the legal split, which implies deterioration of minority
shareholders rights. 70
Incomplete Holding Company Structure
According to the current FTA, it is allowed for the HC to own other than 100%
shares of its affiliates, as a matter of fact, just 50% shares of private affiliate and only
30% shares of listed affiliate. Also, the dual listing status, meaning that the HC and its
affiliate are listed altogether, is not restricted by the relevant financial regulations.
The common practice in regard to the HCs in the western countries is well
illustrated by the General Electric which is a pure HC holding 100% of its 51 affiliates.
70 This issue comes from the dual listing situation. The concern is that the minority shareholders of
affiliates can't not challenge the management of the HC even in the case that they pervasively influence the
managerial decisions of the affiliate
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Naturally only the HC, General Electronics, is listed in NYSE. 71 There are totally
different shapes of HC in Korea. However, unlike the LG's model, Shinhan Bank formed
a pure financial holding company, Shinhan Financial Service, in September 2001,
following the GE's holding company model. 72
So, LG's HC model can be identified as incomplete HC structure compared with
the common practice. (1) This nature raises the problem of dual listing, implying certain
conflict of interests between shareholders between the HC and affiliates. (2) Also
relatively low % criteria of the HC's shareholding to the affiliates allow the majority
shareholders to leverage their corporate control on a large scale.
Future Model of Chaebol's Corporate Control
Furthermore, strategically, under the current LG's HC model, the HC will face
serious difficulties when it needs massive equity financing due to the affiliates' needs
such as operating capital for consistent long-run growth or emergency funding to cope
with certain contingencies. It comes down to the inevitable massive dilution of
controlling stake or giving up the strategic growth and evolution. In that sense, affiliates'
growth possibly conflicts with the corporate control structure of the HC so some are
7' As reviewed in 4.3.1, there is only one exception that GE owns 50% in a Joint Venture
72 The former listed companies in Shinhan financial group together with the privately owned companies
tender-offered their shareholders to swap shares with newly formed HC, consequently the HC held 100%
of most of its affiliates' shares, and the affiliates went private. The HC holds 100% of Shinhan bank which
accounts for more than 80% of paid in capital of the HC, and holds 59.4% of its securities arm which was
decreased from the 100% due to the acquisition of another securities firm in 2002. Also it holds 100% of its
credit card service and installment service. So, although it holds some of the affiliates other than 100%, the
basic strategy is holding 100% of the affiliates.
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skeptical whether the LG's HC model is sustainable and generally applicable to the other
cases. 73
So, considering the uncertain sustainability as well as the incomplete
characteristics of LG's HC model, it must be still regarded just as one of the "prototype"
of governance model of Korean Chaebols which have been consistently asked to
restructure and reform themselves in line with the principles of shareholders capitalism.
It's the remaining tasks for the policy makers, market players, and Chaebols themselves
to improve the current model to cope with the market demands in regard to the reform
and future role of Korean Chaebol. 74 The positive thing is that the discussions regarding
this issue are getting robust these days including the perspective of critics on the generic
shareholders capitalism. 75
73 In the conventional ownership structure, it was technically allowed to make the "circulating investment"
which forms investment connections among affiliates as "A-B-C-A" just avoiding the simple cross
holdings. It was widely used to enhance the controlling stake as the dilution went on over time. But it is
prohibited in the HC structure so that the conflict would be possibly very serious in case
*Interview comment: Overall results of the transaction in the short run was satisfactory so far internally,
however, not sure about the consequences in the long run. Also they anticipate that the LG's HC model
won't be simply applicable to other Chaebols considering the differences in the controlling structures and
relevant cost factors under the current circumstances. Kisup Sung, Executive Vice president, LG Corp
74 Interview comment: FTC haven't set any HC model to drive the Chaebols yet, and just reviewed the
cases implemented whether they complied with the FTC. Ingyoo Park, Deputy Director, Antitrust Bureau,
Fair Trade Commission. / Also the Minister of FTC mentioned many times these days in the press
interview that the current form of HC is tentative corporate structure of Chaebol in transition to the
independent individual companies like those in the US
75 While the government, capital market players, and the citizen activist group altogether have supported
the ideas of shareholders capitalism in Korea in order to reform the Chaebol, enhance the management
transparency, and protect minority shareholders, some of the activist group, such as "Position 21", currently
raised other perspective about the direction of Chaebol's role in the long run. It criticized the side-effects of
shareholders capitalism, for examples, the short-sighted view of investment and its volatility due to the herd
behavior of the investors in the market. It also argued the ultimate direction of reform of Chaebol, the
disintegration, won't be necessarily positive result in light of the past experiences of the large independent
companies in Korea. Therefore it presented unique agenda to perceive Chaebol as a form of"stable
controller" of the large business in the future so that the government would strongly induce the Chaebols to
restructure their corporate control into the HC structure in revision of HC criteria. It even insisted that
banking sector's investment must be allowed in formation of the HC in support of Chaebol's effort if
necessary. Seung II Jung: "Industrial Policy, where is it supposed to go to", Position 21, Progress
Network, Conference, March 14, 2003
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6. Conclusions
In general, it would be considered as acceptable hypothesis that the most of
divestiture cases driven by the strategic purpose of "focus and concentration" have been
justified by the enhancement of shareholders value for last decades since the capital
market increasingly asks the companies to be clean-cut pure players. From the
shareholders capitalism points of view, any corporate formation creating corporate group
or diversification is not desirable so that those cases are to be penalized by the
conglomerate discounts. The AT&T and ITT breakup cases illustrated typical separation
or disintegration of over-diversified businesses resulting in the creation of the American
model of"independent" companies.
The divestitures were introduced in Korea as one of the restructuring instruments
of the corporate sectors in late 1990s in order to overcome the foreign currency crisis, and
it didn't take long until this unusual concept prevailed and practiced widely in the market.
However, in some cases, the divestitures were combined with formation of the HC
structure, which made the issue very complicated one in regard to the reform and
restructuring of large Chaebols in Korea. The LG demerger cases were right in the center
of the discussions.
LG launched the demerger transaction mainly as the corporate control solution
which was to cope with the dilution issue of majority shareholders and compliance issue
to FTA, also as unlocking measure of the fair market valuation. The implementation of
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the HC structure and the Spin-offs were adopted to address the former and latter purposes
respectively. (Hypothesis 1)
The key components that physically materialized the LG's transaction, the smart
alchemy, were (1) the purchase of treasury shares which constituted the framework of the
HC structure upon demerger and (2) the leverage scheme taking advantage of market
price mechanism linked with the splitting of financial statements in demerger. Regulating
principles in regard to the valuation of demerger were suggested. (Hypothesis 2)
From the thorough review of aftermaths, it was obvious that LG transactions
enhanced shareholders value in terms of market valuation both in absolute and relative
term. This shorter term perspective was reasonably justified by the fact that the financial
performance of the related entities was quite positive in last two years when demergers
took place. However, the long run consequences shall be monitored to confirm the
arguments as generally acceptable one in Korea. Also it was believed that the LG
transaction clearly enhanced the corporate control of the majority shareholders after all,
but it didn't necessarily imply the overall improvement of corporate governance.
(Hypothesis 3)
Finally, in regard to the characteristics of the final consequences, LG's model
would be identified as incomplete separation with the HC structure compared with that of
global practice so that it may incur the theoretical and strategic conflicts among the
stakeholders. Therefore, it is not clear whether the LG model would be sustainable to be
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the prevailing form of Chaebols' corporate control in the future, but it can be possibly
defined as just "prototype" about which many controversies and discussions are
underway in Korea. (Hypothesis 4)
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Interviews
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Interviewer
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March 29 - April 1, 2003
Respective offices, Seoul, Korea
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Name
Fair Trade Commission
Antitrust Bureau
Financial Supervisory Board
Disclosure Supervision
LG Corp.
Yunsoo Kim General Policy on HC
(Sr. Deputy Director)
Ingyoo Park
(Deputy Director)
Sukrin Hong Financial Regulatory aspects on HC
(Senior Associate)
Kisup Sung Implementation of HC
(Executive Vice President)
Hyundai Inv. Trust Stanley Jo
(Sr. Fund Manager)
Market Perspective on HC
Hyunwoo Lee
(Fund Manager)
Tong Yang Securities
Proprietary Trading
Taesun Jeon
(Head Fund Manager)
Hyundai Securities
Research Center
Daeyong Park
(Sr. Analyst)
Analyst Perspective on HC
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